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ABSTRACT—On June 11, 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
released his decision in a case called Matter of A-B-, purporting to eliminate 
domestic violence and gang violence as grounds for asylum. The decision 
also cast doubt on the continued viability of asylum claims predicated on 
non-state actor violence, which alarmed LGBTQ advocates, whose asylum 
claims often involve non-state actor persecutors. In making this change, 
Sessions used a previously rarely used feature of the asylum system, the 
Attorney General’s self-certification power. This Note analyzes the potential 
impact of Matter of A-B- on LGBTQ asylum seekers. Based on the text of 
the decision, Matter of A-B- should have a less extreme impact on LGBTQ 
and other asylum seekers than advocates initially feared. But the actual 
impact of the decision is nonetheless alarming. Statistical and anecdotal 
evidence indicates that Matter of A-B- contributed to record high denial rates 
in 2018, and some asylum seekers denied as a result identified as LGBTQ. 
This discrepancy between the text of the decision and its practical impact 
highlights several deeply troubling features of the U.S. asylum system, 
including the broad discretion afforded to adjudicators and lack of judicial 
independence. Because of these factors, when the Attorney General uses his 
self-certification power in the asylum context, one person has vast power to 
make sweeping changes to a process with life and death stakes, a level of 
power that is contrary to the norms of checks and balances that underpin our 
democratic system. This Note argues that the case study of Matter of 
A-B- and its impact on LGBTQ asylum claims reveals serious problems with 
the rule of law in the U.S. asylum system. 
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“The very essence of the rule of law . . . is that individual cases should be 
disposed of by reference to standardized norms rather than by arbitrary factors, 
particularly the personal biases, attitudes, policies, or ideologies of government 
adjudicators.” 
Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 11, 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions used a 
previously rarely used self-certification power1 to release an opinion in a case 
called Matter of A-B- that appeared to eliminate domestic violence and gang 
violence as potential grounds for asylum.2 After decades of efforts by asylum 
 
 † Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
295, 299–300 (2007). 
 1 Because the Board of Immigration Appeals is situated within the Department of Justice, the 
Attorney General has the power to refer immigration cases to himself and issue decisions. Infra Section 
I.B.2. 
 2 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018); Katie Benner & Caitlin Dickerson, Sessions Says 
Domestic and Gang Violence Are Not Grounds for Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/sessions-domestic-violence-asylum.html 
[https://perma.cc/AH5B-Z29T]. Despite misleading headlines issued by numerous media outlets at the 
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and women’s rights advocates, domestic violence was officially recognized 
as grounds for asylum in 2014,3 a hard-fought victory that Sessions’s 
decision in A-B- appeared to erase overnight.4 The viability of domestic 
violence and gang violence as bases for asylum claims is of vital importance 
to tens of thousands of lives.5 Since 2014, the United States has seen an influx 
of asylum seekers at the southern border fleeing violence in Central 
America,6 the vast majority of whom are escaping domestic violence, gang 
violence, or a combination of both.7 In the asylum context, the stakes are life 
and death.8 
Along with references to domestic violence and gang violence, 
Sessions’s opinion in Matter of A-B- also contained language that seemed to 
 
time of the decision’s release, see infra note 21, this Note argues that Matter of A-B- did not create a 
categorical bar on domestic violence and gang violence-based asylum claims. Infra Section II.C. 
 3 A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 394–95 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 4 NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ASYLUM PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER 
MATTER OF A-B-, at 2–3 (2018), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-
type/resource/documents/2018-06/Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%20Final% 
20-%206.21.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVV7-JZQW] [hereinafter NIJC ADVISORY]. Meanwhile, 
applicants fleeing gang violence have never had a precedential decision to rely on, and such applicants 
have rarely succeeded in receiving asylum, though it was possible. SEBASTIAN AMAR ET AL., CAPITAL 
AREA IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS COAL., SEEKING ASYLUM FROM GANG-BASED VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA: A RESOURCE MANUAL 8 (2007), https://www.unhcr.org/en-ie/585a96a34.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9FGB-QZZN] (“To put it simply, it is extremely difficult to succeed in an asylum claim 
that is based on Central American gang violence.”). 
 5 While data on the grounds for asylum seekers’ claims is not publicly available, domestic violence 
and gang violence are among the most common concerns cited by asylum seekers fleeing Central 
America. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM IN CRISIS: 
CHARTING A WAY FORWARD 18–19 (2018). In 2017, U.S. immigration courts received 142,961 asylum 
applications. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, STATISTICS YEARBOOK: 
FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 24 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1107056/download 
[https://perma.cc/6LHD-3RD3] [hereinafter STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2017]. 
 6 MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 1011, 19; Benner & Dickerson, supra note 2. 
 7 MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 19; Jonathan Blitzer, Jeff Sessions Is Out, but His Dark Vision 
for Immigration Policy Lives On, NEW YORKER (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/jeff-sessions-is-out-but-his-dark-vision-for-immigration-policy-lives-on [https://perma.cc/W3NS-
FW6D] (reporting that after A-B- was released, an asylum officer stated, “Ninety per cent of the people 
I’ve referred to a judge for an asylum hearing were referred on the basis of gang-related violence or 
domestic violence in Central America. Now what?”). 
 8 Sarah Stillman, When Deportation Is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence 
[https://perma.cc/MKV2-SEX6] (identifying over sixty cases of deportees who were later murdered or 
greatly harmed); see also Maria Sacchetti, ‘Death Is Waiting for Him,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/asylum-deported-ms-13-
honduras/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4bc0447fe43b [https://perma.cc/2S49-P3DN] (telling the story of 
a father of two who was denied asylum, deported, and found murdered within a year). See generally 
DAVID NGARURI KENNEY & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ASYLUM DENIED: A REFUGEE’S STRUGGLE FOR SAFETY 
IN AMERICA (2008) (providing an in-depth account of a Kenyan man whose asylum claim was denied 
and who, upon his return to Kenya, was nearly murdered). 
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threaten the continued viability of other claims based on persecution 
perpetrated by non-state actors.9 This alarmed LGBTQ advocates.10 Like 
domestic violence claims, LGBTQ asylum claims often involve persecution 
perpetrated not by the police or the military, but by non-state actors that the 
government is either unable or unwilling to control, such as family 
members.11 In addition, both types of claims usually rely on proving 
membership in a “particular social group,” as opposed to one of the other 
protected grounds for asylum.12  
Thousands of LGBTQ individuals likely seek asylum in the United 
States every year.13 Although LGBTQ people have made great strides over 
 
 9 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018) (“While I do not decide that violence inflicted by non-
governmental actors may never serve as the basis for an asylum or withholding application based on 
membership in a particular social group, in practice such claims are unlikely to satisfy the statutory 
grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable or unwilling to address.”). This Note 
argues that while this language appears to call the continued viability of non-state actor claims into 
question, such claims are still cognizable after Matter of A-B-. Infra Section II.C. 
 10 See, e.g., Immigration Equality Statement on AG Sessions’ Decision in Matter of A-B-, IMMIGR. 
EQUALITY (June 12, 2018, 4:53 PM), available at https://www.immigrationequality.org/immigration-
equality-statement-on-ag-sessions-decision-in-matter-of-a-b/#.XBJX_WhKjIU [https://perma.cc/5X7V-
C87M]) (“The Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B- will certainly make it harder for many 
refugees to secure the safety they deserve.”); Arthur S. Leonard, Sessions’ New Asylum Posture & 
LGBTQ Refugees, GAY CITY NEWS (Sept. 4, 2018, 2:20 PM), https://gaycitynews.nyc/stories/2018/12/ 
w30542-sessions-new-asylum-posture-lgbtq-refugees-2018-06-13.html [https://perma.cc/Q529-ZQUK] 
(describing Sessions’s opinion as a “hardline position” and underscoring that continued treatment of 
LGBTQ people as a protected class depends on administrative interpretation by “the anti-LGBTQ Trump 
administration”); Mark Joseph Stern, Jeff Sessions’ Latest Immigration Ruling Is a Violation of 
International Law, SLATE (June 14, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/jeff-
sessions-ruling-in-matter-of-a-b-is-a-violation-of-international-law.html [https://perma.cc/3KEY-
E84W] (“By reaching so far, Sessions’ opinion creates a problem for LGBTQ asylum-seekers.”). 
Although various sources use different acronyms, this Note uses the acronym LGBTQ to refer to lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer people. This Note will also use the umbrella term “queer” to refer 
to this community. For a discussion of this terminology, see GLAAD MEDIA REFERENCE GUIDE 6 (10th 
ed. 2016), http://www.glaad.org/sites/default/files/GLAAD-Media-Reference-Guide-Tenth-Edition.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/39JR-Q52V]. 
 11 See infra Section II.B. 
 12 To receive asylum in the United States, applicants must prove that they have a well-founded fear 
of persecution in their home country because of one of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, or particular social group. Infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 13 It is impossible to know for sure how many asylum claims are based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity, as the U.S. government does not collect this information. However, one organization 
estimated that such claims comprise approximately 5% of U.S. asylum claims as of 2012. LGBT 
FREEDOM ASYLUM NETWORK, STRONGER TOGETHER: A GUIDE TO SUPPORTING LGBT ASYLUM 
SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2015), available at https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/ 
LGBT_Asylum_Seekers_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA4Z-CJT7]. In 2017, U.S. immigration courts 
received 142,961 asylum applications. STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2017, supra note 5, at 24. 
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the past decades in terms of both legal protections14 and social acceptance15 
in the United States, being LGBTQ still carries a heavy price in many parts 
of the world.16 As of 2018, seventy-three countries outlaw homosexuality; in 
eight it is punishable by death.17 Even when not explicitly criminalized, 
LGBTQ people in many countries are heavily stigmatized and frequently 
face violence perpetrated by family members, neighbors, and other non-state 
actors.18 If Matter of A-B- negatively impacts the viability of LGBTQ asylum 
claims, forcing applicants to return to countries where they face persecution, 
it could jeopardize tens of thousands of lives. 
At first glance, Matter of A-B- did not appear to have as severe an 
impact on LGBTQ claims as advocates feared.19 The language in the opinion 
that poses the greatest threat to LGBTQ asylum claims is nonbinding dicta, 
and the actual holding of the case is narrow—it merely overturns the 2014 
precedential domestic violence case Matter of A-R-C-G-.20 Despite alarming 
media coverage of the decision,21 it does not categorically bar domestic 
 
 14 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (finding a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage); U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down the Defense of Marriage Act, a federal 
law that defined marriage as a union between a woman and a man); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003) (finding laws criminalizing sodomy unconstitutional). 
 15 Press Release, NORC at the University of Chicago, Americans Move Dramatically Toward 
Acceptance of Homosexuality Finds GSS Report (Sept. 2011), http://www.norc.org/ 
NewsEventsPublications/PressReleases/Pages/american-acceptance-of-homosexuality-gss-report.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/DEU3-D2Z5] (based on data released in September 2011). In 2018, GLAAD data 
showed an increase in non-LGBTQ Americans who reported feeling uncomfortable around LGBTQ 
people in some situations for the first time in many years. GLAAD, Accelerating Acceptance 2018: 
Executive Summary (2018), http://www.glaad.org/files/aa/Accelerating%20Acceptance%202018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/84UV-PECV] [hereinafter GLAAD Acceptance Report]. However, 79% still reported 
support for equal rights for the LGBTQ community, id., a sharp increase in support over less than a decade 
prior when only 46% reported support for marriage equality. See Press Release, NORC at the University 
of Chicago, supra. 
 16 Rosamond Hutt, This Is the State of LGBTI Rights Around the World in 2018, WORLD ECON. F. 
(June 14, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/lgbti-rights-around-the-world-in-2018 
[https://perma.cc/9EJP-9SQH]. 
 17 Id. 
 18 See id.; VIOLENCE ASIA, infra note 133 at 16–17 (“Individual violators [of LBT women’s rights] 
include neighbors, passersby in public spaces, family members, intimate partners, religious vigilantes, or 
co-workers.”).  
 19 See infra Section II.C. 
 20 See infra Section II.C. 
 21 See, e.g., Benner & Dickerson, supra note 2; Joel Rose, Attorney General Denies Asylum to 
Victims of Domestic Abuse, Gang Violence, NPR (June 11 2018, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/11/618988483/attorney-general-denies-asylum-to-victims-of-domestic-
abuse-gang-violence [https://perma.cc/8N4C-XJJ5]; Maria Sacchetti, Sessions: Victims of Domestic 
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violence claims, gang violence claims, or other claims involving non-state 
actor persecutors.22 Analysis of the court decisions that have cited the case 
since its release supports this interpretation.23 In theory, the case’s impact on 
LGBTQ asylum seekers should be limited. 
However, Matter of A-B-’s practical impact on LGBTQ claims is likely 
far more consequential than the text of the opinion or those citing decisions 
would make one believe.24 The year 2018 saw the highest overall rate of 
asylum denials in the U.S. in two decades, and statistics show a spike in 
denials shortly after A-B- was released.25 Anecdotal evidence indicates that 
many asylum adjudicators have interpreted the holding of A-B- to be broader 
than it truly is, causing them to reject claims that previously would have been 
viable, including several documented LGBTQ claims.26 
The discrepancy between the text of A-B- and its potential impact 
reveals serious problems with the rule of law in the U.S. asylum system.27 In 
particular, it shows that the existence of the Attorney General’s (AG’s) self-
certification power allows individuals like Sessions to make sweeping 
changes to the asylum system with few limitations.28 Because of the nature 
of the U.S. asylum system—which has limited binding precedent, little 
meaningful appellate review, broad discretion afforded to adjudicators, and 
a lack of judicial independence—a decision like A-B- can have far-reaching 
consequences.29 
This Note explores the potential impact of Matter of A-B- on LGBTQ-
based asylum claims and argues that that impact lays bare the absence of the 
rule of law in the U.S. asylum system. Part I provides an overview of the 
asylum process and highlights several problematic features of that process. 
Part II summarizes relevant case law in both the domestic violence and 
LGBTQ contexts, with emphasis on the similarities between the two types 
of claims, and explores Matter of A-B- itself. Part III explores the impact of 
A-B- so far, including its impact on LGBTQ asylum claims, and argues that 
the broad discretionary power granted to asylum adjudicators will allow 
adjudicators to either misinterpret the holding of A-B- or be emboldened to 
reject more claims on the basis of personal anti-LGBTQ bias. 
 
 22 See infra Section II.C. 
 23 See infra Sections III.A.1–III.A.2. 
 24 See infra Sections III.A.4–III.A.5. 
 25 See infra note 207–209 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra Section III.A.5. 
 27 See infra Part IV. 
 28 See infra Part IV. 
 29 See infra Part IV. 
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Ultimately, the discrepancy between what the Matter of A-B- decision 
actually says and what its practical impact will be highlights a broader 
problem in the asylum context: the serious threat to the rule of law that 
Attorney General review and broad adjudicator discretion pose in the asylum 
system. Therefore, Part IV proposes potential changes that could be 
implemented to address some of the wider systemic problems in the asylum 
system that Matter of A-B- illuminates. Part IV suggests that eliminating the 
AG’s self-certification power and reducing adjudicator discretion through 
increased data collection and transparency or creating a new system of 
Article I immigration courts could help to restore confidence in the rule of 
law in the asylum system. Additionally, Part IV proposes ensuring 
representation of all asylum seekers, given the extremely high human stakes 
of asylum proceedings and as an additional measure to guarantee the rule of 
law. 
I. THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM 
This Part provides general background information on relevant features 
of the U.S. asylum process. It introduces the way the asylum system 
functions and the elements of an asylum claim. It then highlights several 
unique features of the asylum process, including the unusually powerful role 
of the Attorney General, the comparative scarcity of binding precedent, and 
the broad discretion granted to adjudicators. 
A. The Asylum Process 
This Section describes the basic steps an asylum applicant must take, 
the Credible Fear Interview, and the elements of an asylum claim. 
1. Asylum Process Basics 
U.S. asylum law has its roots in international law.30 In 1968, the United 
States became a party to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees (Refugee Convention).31 The heart of the Refugee Convention 
was the idea that member nations cannot return people to countries where 
they face threats to their “life or freedom.”32 Key provisions of the Refugee 
 
 30 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 9–13, 19–24 (2018 ed. 2018) 
(discussing the ways in which domestic asylum laws were passed to bring the U.S. into compliance with 
international agreements). 
 31 Id. at 9. 
 32 Text of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees at 3, opened 
for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152 (entered into force Apr. 22, 
1954), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10 [https://perma.cc/UW9X-CKGR] [hereinafter Refugee 
Convention] (“The principle of nonrefoulement is so fundamental that no reservations or derogations may 
be made to it. It provides that no one shall expel or return . . . a refugee against his or her will, in any 
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Convention, including the definition of “refugee,” were codified into U.S. 
law through the Refugee Act of 1980, an amendment to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).33 The difference between a refugee and an asylum 
seeker is essentially one of geography—asylum seekers apply when 
physically present in the United States or at the border, while refugees apply 
while abroad.34 People who are granted asylum receive permanent status in 
the U.S., including employment authorization and access to government 
benefits.35 They are eligible to become a lawful permanent resident one year 
after receiving asylum and can become U.S. citizens four years after that.36 
There are two main routes an asylum seeker can take to apply for 
asylum.37 Asylum seekers who have not been apprehended by government 
agents and placed in removal proceedings can file an “affirmative 
application.”38 Affirmative applications are handled by the Department of 
Homeland Security.39 Applicants are interviewed by a United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) asylum officer, who can 
grant or deny their claim.40 If their claim is denied, they are placed in removal 
proceedings and are then in the “defensive” asylum track.41 
The majority of asylum applications are filed using this second, 
“defensive” route after an individual has already been placed in removal 
 
manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom.”). International 
commitment to this norm arose in the wake of World War II, during which several countries, including 
the United States, turned away Jews fleeing Nazism, many of whom were later killed. See Naomi S. Stern, 
Evian’s Legacy: The Holocaust, the United Nations Refugee Convention, and Post-War Refugee 
Legislation in the United States, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 324–25 (2004). 
 33 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (defining “refugee”); ANKER, supra note 30, at 13–14, 19. The 
INA is the primary statute governing immigration issues, including asylum. See Immigration and 
Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/ 
immigration-and-nationality-act [https://perma.cc/KQ5T-VM7T]. 
 34 ANKER, supra note 30, at 26. 
 35 If You’ve Won Asylum, IMMIGR. EQUALITY (2015), https://www.immigrationequality.org/get-
legal-help/our-legal-resources/asylum/if-youve-won-asylum [https://perma.cc/8AZY-57P8]. 
 36 Id. Two similar, but slightly different, forms of relief are withholding of removal under the INA 
and protection under the Convention Against Torture, usually sought by applicants who are ineligible for 
asylum. ANKER, supra note 30, at 4. These forms of relief have a slightly higher burden of proof and offer 
fewer benefits; for instance, withholding of removal does not grant applicants a permanent legal status in 
the United States and recipients may be removed to third-party countries. Id. at 6–8. 
 37 Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/DC5V-YSEQ] [hereinafter USCIS Obtaining Asylum]. 
 38 ANKER, supra note 30, at 28; USCIS Obtaining Asylum, supra note 37. 
 39 ANKER, supra note 30, at 28. 
 40 Id. at 28–29. 
 41 Id. at 29. 
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proceedings.42 While the Department of Homeland Security oversees all 
affirmative applications, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has jurisdiction 
over defensive claims.43 These claims are heard in immigration courts by 
immigration judges (IJs) under the Executive Office of Immigration 
Review.44 Unlike affirmative asylum interviews before asylum officers, 
which are closer to a conversation than a trial, defensive claims are argued 
in immigration court, an adversarial process.45 Asylum officers and IJs make 
determinations of whether the applicant satisfied the requirements of an 
asylum claim and whether the applicant was credible.46 
If an immigration judge denies a claim, the applicant may appeal to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which reviews cases for the entire 
nation.47 The BIA defers to IJ findings of fact using a “clearly erroneous” 
standard of review.48 If a party loses on appeal to the BIA, they can then 
appeal an adverse finding to the federal court of appeals where the case was 
initially filed.49 Courts of appeals review BIA decisions using a “substantial 
evidence” test for factual determinations, and review questions of law de 
novo.50 The court of appeals’ heightened “substantial evidence” standard is 
even more deferential to the lower courts’ decisions on questions of fact than 
the BIA’s “clearly erroneous” standard, meaning that an applicant’s chances 
of having an adverse decision reversed decreases at every step of the 
process.51 
 
 42 Id.; Asylum Decisions Graph Tool, TRACIMMIGRATION, SYRACUSE UNIV., https://trac.syr.edu/ 
phptools/immigration/asylum [https://perma.cc/EHF3-KTDL] [hereinafter TRAC Immigration Graph 
Tool] (showing that 88% of asylum applications filed in fiscal year 2019 were defensive). 
 43 ANKER, supra note 30, at 29 n.1. 
 44 USCIS Obtaining Asylum, supra note 37. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 306. 
 47 ANKER, supra note 30, at 30. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) attorneys opposing 
the claim may also appeal decisions to grant asylum to the BIA. As of September 2019, the BIA consists 
of twenty members. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals-bios [https://perma.cc/KTW5-MGGQ]. 
 48 ANKER, supra note 30, at 30. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Michael English, Distinguishing True Persecution from Legitimate Prosecution in American 
Asylum Law, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 109, 187–88 (2007) (describing the Court’s interpretation of the 
“substantial evidence” standard for asylum cases as “all but insurmountable”); Matthew H. Joseph, 
Comment, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias: Partially Closing the Door on 
Political Asylum, 52 MD. L. REV. 478, 499 (1993) (noting that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
“substantial evidence” standard in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), raised the standard of 
review to the point that “[o]nly glaringly unreasonable decisions will be overturned” (footnote omitted)). 
In theory, parties could appeal a court of appeals decision to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court 
has only reviewed a handful of asylum cases since the Refugee Act’s passage in 1980. Thus, in practice, 
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2. Credible Fear Interviews 
In 1996, Congress created a procedure called “expedited removal” that 
allows undocumented non-citizens who were apprehended within two weeks 
of their arrival and 100 miles of the border to be immediately removed from 
the country without a hearing.52 Because it would be a violation of 
international law to return people to a place where they would face 
persecution,53 Congress included an exception in the form of the “Credible 
Fear Interview” (CFI).54 Non-citizens can temporarily avoid expedited 
removal if they state that they are afraid to return to their home country or 
intend to apply for asylum.55 In that event, they are entitled to a CFI, which 
is conducted by an asylum officer.56 If they are found to have a credible fear 
of persecution in their home country, they are taken out of expedited removal 
proceedings and placed in regular defensive removal proceedings before an 
IJ.57 The applicant will then have an opportunity to develop a full record and 
have access to all of the normal routes of appeal.58 If a non-citizen receives a 
negative credible fear assessment, they remain in expedited removal 
proceedings and are swiftly deported.59 They can request review of the 
negative finding by an IJ, but they receive no additional access to appeals.60 
The level of review afforded in these circumstances is minimal; IJs can forgo 
 
the courts of appeals are the final stop for appealing adverse asylum decisions made by immigration 
judges. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 310. 
 52 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (2009); ANKER, supra note 30, at 26–27. In July 2019, the Trump 
administration attempted to remove these temporal and geographic limitations and expand the application 
of expedited removal to include people apprehended within two years of their arrival anywhere in the 
country. Practice Alert: Trump Administration Expands Application of Expedited Removal, AM. IMMIGR. 
LAW. ASS’N (July 22, 2019), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-practice-pointers-and-alerts/trump-
administration-expands-expedited-removal [https://perma.cc/PY8L-YUS3]; see also Designating Aliens 
for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35409 (July 23, 2019). A federal judge issued a nationwide 
preliminary injunction blocking implementation of these changes during pending litigation over their 
legality in September 2019. Make the Rd. New York v. McAleenan, No. 19-CV-2369 (KBJ), 2019 WL 
4738070, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2019). As of this writing, the government appeal of the injunction is 
pending in the D.C. Circuit. Make the Rd. New York v. McAleenan, No. 19-CV-2369 (KBJ), 2019 WL 
4738070, appeal docketed, No. 19-5298 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 31, 2019). 
 53 Refugee Convention, supra note 32, at 30. 
 54 ANKER, supra note 30, at 27. A “Reasonable Fear Interview” (RFI) is the equivalent for 
withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture claims. Id. at 28. 
 55 Id. at 27. 
 56 Id. 
 57 MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 2; Questions & Answers: Credible Fear Screening, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-
answers-credible-fear-screening [https://perma.cc/VB93-HEJC] [hereinafter USCIS Credible Fear]. 
 58 See Questions & Answers, supra note 57.  
 59 See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (2012).  
 60 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).  
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meeting the applicant in person and conduct their review via 
videoconference or on the phone.61 
The statutory standard for establishing a credible fear through the CFI 
is whether there is a “significant possibility” that the non-citizen “could 
establish eligibility for asylum.”62 The applicant is not required to prove their 
asylum claim at this stage. In short, Congress intended “credible fear” to be 
a low bar so that no one with a possibly valid asylum claim would be sent to 
face possible death in their home country.63 In 2016, a credible fear was 
found in almost eighty percent of interviews.64 The number of CFIs 
conducted annually has skyrocketed over the past decade—coinciding with 
a spike in asylum-seekers fleeing violence in Central America65—making the 
CFI an increasingly important feature of the asylum process.66 
3. Elements of an Asylum Claim 
To receive asylum, applicants must prove that they meet the definition 
of “refugee.”67 This requires proving four elements: (1) that they have a well-
founded fear of persecution if they return to their home country; (2) that the 
persecution is “on account of” (3) a protected ground (race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group); 
and (4) that the persecution is perpetrated by the government or by an actor 
the government is “unable or unwilling” to control.68 
 
 61 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). 
 62 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (emphasis added). 
 63 H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 158 (1996) (“[T]here should be no danger that an alien with a 
genuine asylum claim will be returned to persecution.”); Hillary Gaston Walsh, Forever Barred: 
Reinstated Removal Orders and the Right to Seek Asylum, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 613, 624–25 (2017) 
(discussing the “extremely low” bar that Congress set to protect people with credible asylum claims). 
 64 Credible Fear Cases Completed and Referrals for Credible Fear Interview, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/readingroom/RFA/credible-fear-
cases-interview [https://perma.cc/7ELE-ZEAZ]. 
 65 MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. 
 66 In fiscal year 2008, 5,047 CFIs were conducted, as compared with 91,786 in fiscal year 2016. 
Credible Fear Cases, supra note 64. 
 67 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 68 Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., BASIC PROCEDURAL MANUAL 
FOR ASYLUM REPRESENTATION AFFIRMATIVELY AND IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS  9 (2019), https:// 
immigrantjustice.org/for-attorneys/legal-resources/file/nijc-procedural-manual-asylum-representation-
pdf [https://perma.cc/C6GF-DQEM] [hereinafter NIJC Asylum Basics Manual]. To prove a well-founded 
fear of persecution, many applicants rely on evidence of past persecution. ANKER, supra note 30, at 49. 
There is no set definition of what constitutes persecution. Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 71–72 
(2d Cir. 2011) (“[Persecution] is not statutorily defined and courts have not ‘settled on a single, uniform 
definition . . . .’” (quoting Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 340 (2d Cir. 2006))). Most 
circuits’ definitions encompass a requirement that the harm be severe. See, e.g., Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 
83, 90 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[P]ersecution requires more than mere discomfiture, unpleasantness, harassment, 
or unfair treatment . . . .” (quoting Lopez–Castro v. Holder, 577 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2009)) (internal 
quotations omitted)); Camara v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Importantly, ‘the 
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For both victims of domestic or gang violence and LGBTQ asylum 
applicants, the most relevant protected ground is “membership in a particular 
social group” (PSG). In Matter of Acosta, the BIA stated that members of a 
PSG must share an “immutable characteristic” that they “either cannot 
change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their 
individual identities or consciences;”69 this “immutable characteristic” test 
was the prevailing standard for determining membership in a PSG for many 
years.70 In more recent cases, the BIA added requirements that PSGs have 
sufficient “particularity” and “social distinction.”71 “Particularity” 
essentially means that a group must have clearly discernable boundaries and 
must not be overbroad.72 Social distinction refers to the fact that a PSG must 
be a grouping recognized by society, not one formulated merely for the 
purposes of the asylum claim.73 
The “on account of” prong is frequently referred to as “nexus,” meaning 
applicants must show a connection between the protected ground and the 
reason for their persecution. In other words, applicants’ membership in the 
protected group must be a factor motivating their persecution.74 Notably, the 
 
concept of persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even 
unlawful or unconstitutional.’” (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993))). 
 69 Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 70 NIJC Asylum Basics Manual, supra note 68, at 14. 
 71 See M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 232–33 (B.I.A. 2014) (discussing the particularity and social 
visibility requirements, and clarifying that literal, ocular visibility is not required); S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 
579 (B.I.A. 2008) (discussing particularity and social visibility requirements); E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 
(B.I.A. 2008). The “social distinction” requirement was originally termed “social visibility,” but the BIA 
amended the phrasing as a result of confusion in the lower courts. M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N at 236. 
 72 M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N at 239 (noting that particularity means that particular social groups “must not 
be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective”). 
 73 Id. at 240, 242. Whether a group is considered “socially distinct” is highly fact dependent. For 
example, the Board suggested that in an underdeveloped, oligarchic country, “landowners” might be 
viewed as a discrete group by society in a way that they would not be in, for example, Canada. Id. at 241. 
While most circuits have adopted the particularity and social distinction requirements, the Seventh Circuit 
has found that they did not merit Chevron deference, and it continues to apply only the Acosta “immutable 
characteristic” formulation. Id. at 233 (“Our articulation of these requirements has been met with approval 
in the clear majority of the Federal courts of appeals. However, it has not been universally accepted.” 
(citations omitted)). See also Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2013); Gatimi v. Holder, 
578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009).  
 74 Applicants may prove nexus with direct or circumstantial evidence, as obtaining direct evidence 
is often impossible because persecutors rarely announce the reasons for their actions. ANKER, supra note 
30, at 373 n.3 (“[N]oting, in an imputed political opinion case, that it would be ‘absurd’ to expect applicant 
to produce direct evidence of persecutor’s reasons and, in certain cases, ‘factual circumstances alone may 
constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence.’” (citing Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 607 F.3d 
101, 109 (3d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted)); id. (“[N]oting that, where persecution of petitioner 
was just as likely motivated by his wealth as by his prior partisan affiliation, petitioner must provide some 
evidence—either direct or circumstantial—of persecutor’s reasons.” (citing Pablo-Sanchez v. Holder, 
600 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2010))). 
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BIA has found that it is acceptable for a perpetrator to have mixed motives, 
as long as the protected ground is “one central reason” motivating the 
persecution.75 
With regard to the fourth prong, the cases with which this Note is 
concerned are more likely to involve the government being “unable or 
unwilling to control” a persecutor than the government itself being the 
persecutor, because the persecutors in domestic violence, gang violence, and 
LGBTQ asylum claims are most frequently non-state actors.76 It is well-
established, both in the INA definition of a refugee and in case law, that non-
state-actor persecution can qualify for asylum purposes as long as the 
applicant shows that the government was “unable or unwilling” to control 
the persecutor.77 
B. Judicial Actors and Discretion 
There are several kinds of decision-makers within the asylum system, 
and they operate under precious few constraints. The AG plays an outsize 
role in defining immigration policy for the entire nation, and these policy 
goals are implemented by IJs with a great deal of discretion over individual 
cases.78 
 
 75 S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486, 495 (B.I.A. 1996) (“In some fact situations, the evidence may reasonably 
suggest mixed motives, at least one or more of which is related to a protected ground.”);  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“To establish that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of such section, 
the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”).  
 76 Infra Section II.A. 
 77 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); NIJC Asylum Basics Manual, supra note 68 at 12; see, e.g., 
Morales-Morales v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 130, 135 (1st Cir. 2017) (noting that an asylum applicant must 
show that the harm suffered was “the direct result of government action, government-supported action, 
or government unwillingness or inability to control private conduct” (quoting Guaman–Loja v. Holder, 
707 F.3d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 2013)) (citation and alterations omitted)); Khan v. Holder, 727 F.3d 1, 7 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (“Persecution ‘always implies some connection to government action or inaction’ . . . .” 
(quoting Harutyunyan v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 2005)); Lopez Perez v. Holder, 587 F.3d 
456, 462 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he government must practice, encourage, or countenance [persecution], or 
at least prove itself unable or unwilling to combat it.”); Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(rejecting decisions of the Board and immigration judge, where the latter determined the applicant “ha[d] 
at no time indicated that she was ever subjected to persecution, abuse, or harassment by any element of 
the Russian Government,” emphasizing that “it is well established that private acts may be persecution if 
the government has proved unwilling to control such actions” (quoting Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir. 2006))). 
 78 S. POVERTY LAW CTR., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S JUDGES: HOW THE U.S. IMMIGRATION 
COURTS BECAME A DEPORTATION TOOL (2019), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
com_policyreport_the_attorney_generals_judges_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK4H-L4K4]. 
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1. Precedent 
A unique feature of the immigration system is the relative scarcity of 
binding precedent. In the asylum context, these few precedents come from 
several sources, including IJ, BIA and Attorney General decisions. Decisions 
of IJs are not binding on other IJs but can still be persuasive.79 Published BIA 
decisions set precedent for IJs and asylum officers throughout the country.80 
Circuit courts may contradict a BIA decision, but the circuit court’s decision 
is controlling only within that circuit; the BIA must follow the precedents of 
the circuit where the case originated.81 Attorney General decisions have the 
same precedential value as BIA decisions and are therefore generally binding 
nationwide.82 
The majority of asylum decisions, however, are unpublished and 
therefore nonbinding.83 Asylum officers usually do not issue a written 
decision in affirmative asylum proceedings, and IJs are only required to 
document those decisions that are later appealed to the BIA, which is a small 
minority of cases.84 The BIA, meanwhile, publishes only a miniscule fraction 
of its decisions, a number that has been reduced even further by policy 
changes.85 Unpublished BIA decisions are merely persuasive, and it is now 
 
 79 IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, LGBTQ ASYLUM MANUAL: 2. ASYLUM BASICS: SOURCES OF LAW  
(3d ed. 2006), https://www.immigrationequality.org/get-legal-help/our-legal-resources/immigration-
equality-asylum-manual/asylum-basics-sources-of-law [https://perma.cc/53BD-AHSR] [hereinafter 
IMMIGRATION EQUALITY MANUAL]. 
 80 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 349. 
 81 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 349–50. Attorney Generals have the power to designate 
cases as precedential that were not originally published. Zsea Bowmani, Queer Refuge: The Impacts of 
Homoantagonism and Racism in U.S. Asylum Law, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 33–34 (2017). 
 82 The exception is if a circuit declines to afford an AG decision Chevron deference. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) (establishing the two-part test for 
judicial review of federal agency interpretations of federal statutes). When doing a Chevron analysis, 
courts first ask whether Congress has spoken on a given issue; if so, the court and the agency are required 
to follow Congress. If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous on the specific issue, the courts are 
required to defer to the agency’s interpretation unless that interpretation is “arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. 
 83 See Bowmani, supra note 81, at 19. 
 84 Id. In 2015, only 8% of IJ decisions were appealed to the BIA, id. at 34, and in 2017, only 11%, 
STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2017, supra note 5, at 41. Asylum officers are also not required to release their 
CFI notes to the asylum seekers, which are often incomplete, inaccurate, or both. James Feroli, Real ID, 
Airport and Credible Fear Interview Notes, and the Myth of Reliability for Asylum Applicants Subject to 
Expedited Removal, 13-01 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 2 (2013) (discussing the ways in which inaccurate CFI 
notes can contribute to adverse credibility determinations for asylum seekers). 
 85 In 2002, Department of Justice “streamlining” regulations changed the dominant form of BIA 
review from three-member panels to review by a single Board member. ANKER, supra note 30, at 12. As 
a result, the percentage of published BIA decisions dropped from approximately 0.256% in 1996 to 0.01% 
in 2004. Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 676–
77 (2008). In 2017, the BIA published 24 decisions out of 31,820, or 0.075%. STATISTICS YEARBOOK 
2017, supra note 5, at 36; Executive Office of Immigration Review, Vol 27: AG/BIA Decisions Listing, 
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common for BIA decisions to consist only of a summary affirmance without 
any written opinion.86 And while circuit court decisions are binding within 
their jurisdiction, few cases ever make it that far. This paucity of binding 
precedent gives asylum adjudicators at every stage of the process far greater 
flexibility in reaching their decisions than judges in traditional courts, 
contributing to a system with vast disparities in outcomes between individual 
judges, regions, and courts.87 
2. The Attorney General’s Outsize Role 
The Attorney General has an unusually powerful role in the 
immigration context.88 The BIA and immigration courts are bodies of the 
Department of Justice that were established by the Attorney General through 
an exercise of his “delegated authority.”89 The AG therefore has the power 
to overrule BIA decisions, change its procedures, and “appoint and remove 
Board members who disagree with his political ideology.”90 Furthermore, 
immigration judges are employees of the Department of Justice under the 
control of the Attorney General.91 Unlike traditional Article III judges, who 
are largely insulated from political pressures by constitutional guarantees of 
 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/volume-27 [https://perma.cc/JFR8-
F74K] [hereinafter AG/BIA Precedent Listing]. From 2013 to 2018, the BIA published an average of 
twenty-five decisions a year. Id. 
 86 IMMIGRATION EQUALITY MANUAL, supra note 79; Bowmani, supra note 81, at 19; Ramji-Nogales 
et al., supra note †, at 350–51. 
 87 See generally Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note † (finding significant disparities in the asylum 
judicial system). The implications of this feature of the asylum system will be discussed in greater detail 
below. Infra Section I.B.3. 
 88 See, e.g., Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he extraordinary and pervasive 
role that the Attorney General plays in immigration matters is virtually unique.”). 
 89 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 309. 
 90 Id. at 350. In 2003, for instance, then-AG John Ashcroft decided that the size of the BIA should 
be reduced to eleven members, supposedly to make the Board more efficient. Id. at 352–53. The Board 
members he fired as a result were not the least senior members, but rather five Clinton appointees who 
disagreed with him ideologically. Id. Three years later, he increased the size of the Board to fifteen, 
essentially allowing him to replace five Democratic appointees with five Republican ones. Id. at 386–87. 
Professor Stephen Legomsky suggests that the collective message of these maneuvers to immigration 
judges and the BIA was clear: “You rule against the government at your personal peril.” Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 370 (2006). He argues 
that the effect was to “drain the administrative phase of the deportation process of all meaningful 
decisional independence.” Id. 
 91 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 387. The INA defines an immigration judge as an attorney 
appointed by the AG who “shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the 
Attorney General shall prescribe.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012). 
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salary protections and lifetime tenure during good behavior,92 IJs have no 
such protections and can be removed from office for any reason.93 
Moreover, the Attorney General has the power to refer any BIA 
decision to himself for review and to issue precedential decisions.94 This 
makes the AG the most powerful policymaker and even lawmaker in the U.S. 
immigration system.95 Prior to Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s brief tenure 
in office, this “certification power” was rarely used.96 Agency head review is 
not an uncommon power in the executive branch, and its purpose is related 
to efficiency, as well as promoting “consistency and coherence” in agency 
decisions.97 However, in the immigration context, the use of this tool is 
controversial, as it essentially enables the AG to create law without going 
through the typical notice and comment procedures involved in 
promulgating new agency regulations.98 Use by the AG of this power often 
involves creating “profound changes” to legal doctrine that affect tens of 
thousands of immigrants.99 The existing BIA regulations do not place any 
limitations on when use of the AG’s certification power is appropriate.100 
3. Judicial Discretion in the Asylum System 
Another unique feature of the immigration system is the large amount 
of discretion afforded to adjudicators, which is baked into the system in 
 
 92 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 93 Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (2018) (noting that 
DOJ regulations indicate that IJs are “subject to removal or reassignment effectively at the Attorney 
General’s discretion”); Legomsky, supra note 90, at 374 (noting that the AG could remove or reassign 
both BIA members and IJs at any time); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 387. The Attorney General 
and Department of Justice management also have the power to decide which cases end up on which 
judge’s dockets. After one senior IJ issued a decision that did not reach the outcome Sessions wanted in 
a deportation case, eighty-six similar cases were removed from that IJ’s calendar, a “strong warning to 
the entire IJ corps.” Jeffrey S. Chase, The Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions,  
JEFFREY S. CHASE BLOG (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/3/28/ 
i6el1do6l5p443u1nkf8vwr28dv9qi [https://perma.cc/Q2RE-5VQB]. 
 94 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2019) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its 
decision all cases that . . . [t]he Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him.”). 
 95 See Justin Chasco, Comment, Judge Alberto Gonzales? The Attorney General’s Power to Overturn 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ Decisions, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 363, 368 (2007). 
 96 Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General 
Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1771 (2010) (noting that 
the Attorney General averaged only about 1.7 certified decisions annually between 1999 and 2009). 
 97 Id. at 1770. 
 98 Chasco, supra note 95, at 369. 
 99 Trice, supra note 96, at 1771. For example, previous uses of this power have affected the 
following: “the standard for determining whether a conviction constitutes a crime involving moral 
turpitude; the retroactivity of amendments to the [INA]; the right to effective assistance of counsel in 
removal proceedings; whether an expunged state conviction constitutes a ‘conviction’ for purposes of the 
INA; and the meaning of ‘particularly serious crime.’” Id. at 1773 (internal citations omitted). 
 100 Id. at 1771; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1). 
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several different ways. First, asylum is a discretionary, not mandatory, form 
of relief.101 This means that the United States is not required to grant asylum 
to every applicant who proves they are statutorily eligible.102 Even if an 
asylum applicant credibly proves every element of their claim, the 
adjudicator still has the power to exercise their discretion to reject their 
application for any number of reasons.103 Although discretionary denials of 
asylum for otherwise qualified applicants are rare,104 asylum officers and IJs 
have additional opportunities to exercise broad discretionary power because 
they make credibility determinations to which the BIA and courts of appeals 
are required to be highly deferential. Finally, there is comparatively little 
binding precedent constraining asylum officer and immigration judge 
decisions.105 
The high level of discretion inherent in the asylum process is reflected 
by the vast disparities in asylum grant and denial rates at every step of the 
asylum process.106 Rates vary widely between regions, asylum offices, 
immigration courts, and circuits.107 Between 2013 and 2018, the IJ with the 
highest denial rate in the country had a denial rate of 100% while the IJ with 
the lowest had a denial rate of 3%.108 Advocates have labeled certain areas of 
the country “asylum-free zones” due to their high denial rates.109 Frequently, 
 
 101 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General 
may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum . . . [if] such alien is a refugee . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); id. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(ii) (stating that, with respect to any discretionary forms of relief from 
removal, applicants have the burden of proving that they “merit[] a favorable exercise of discretion”). See 
generally Kate Aschenbrenner, Discretionary (In)Justice: The Exercise of Discretion in Claims for 
Asylum, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 595 (2012) (discussing the problems caused by asylum being a 
discretionary form of relief); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ASYLUM: VARIATIONS EXIST IN 
OUTCOMES OF APPLICATIONS ACROSS IMMIGRATIONS JUDGES AND COURTS 9 (2016) [hereinafter GAO 
2016] (stating “immigration judges have discretion in rendering decisions” and “asylum is a discretionary 
form of relief under U.S. immigration law”). 
 102 Aschenbrenner, supra note 101, at 596. 
 103 Id. IJs have used their discretion to deny applications of otherwise eligible asylum seekers over 
minor criminal records that are not serious enough to constitute a statutory bar and over a lack of family 
ties in the U.S. Id. at 596, 602–03 (citations omitted) (describing cases of individuals denied asylum). 
 104 Id. at 598. 
 105 See supra Section I.B.1. 
 106 GAO 2016, supra note 101, at 29 (“Immigration judges we spoke with in six immigration courts 
stated that the judicial discretion provided for in U.S. immigration law is one reason that decisions on 
asylum applications, even among judges in the same court, could vary.”). 
 107 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 302. 
 108 Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2013-2018, TRACIMMIGRATION 
(2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2018/denialrates.html [https://perma.cc/35X2-
GLJH] [hereinafter TRAC Judge-by-Judge Decisions]. The judge with the 100% denial rate decided 144 
cases and the judge with the 3% denial rate decided 959 cases. Id. 
 109 Mica Rosenberg et al., They Fled Danger at Home to Make a High-Stakes Bet on U.S. 
Immigration Courts, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-
immigration-asylum [https://perma.cc/RRH6-R8VQ]. 
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there are also huge variations in grant rates from judge to judge within the 
same office, even when controlling for the nationality of the applicants.110 
From 2013 to 2018, in San Francisco, one judge denied 96.9% of asylum 
claims while another denied only 9.9%.111 In short, despite the life and death 
nature of asylum claims, whether an applicant’s claim is granted or denied 
often depends on which asylum officer or immigration judge is randomly 
assigned to their case.112 
The problems with this high level of discretion are compounded by the 
fact that there is relatively little meaningful appellate review of asylum 
claims.113 As discussed above, only a small percentage of cases make it to 
the BIA.114 Once there, the majority of appeals are now decided by a single 
Board member,115 who is required to be highly deferential to IJ findings of 
fact and credibility.116 The shift from three-member review to mostly single-
member review has had drastic consequences for asylum seekers; from 2004 
to 2006, cases decided by three-member panels favored asylum seekers 52% 
of the time, while cases decided by single Board members favored asylum 
seekers 7% of the time.117 The few cases that make it to the courts of appeals 
are also examined under a highly deferential “substantial evidence” 
standard.118 Therefore, even with a meritorious claim, an initial denial by an 
IJ is often never corrected upon review, resulting in deportation—a possible 
death sentence in the asylum context.119 
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CLAIMS, LGBTQ ASYLUM CLAIMS,  
AND MATTER OF A-B- 
Having described the basic mechanics of the United States asylum 
process, this Part now provides background on the development of relevant 
 
 110 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 332; see also Rosenberg, supra note 109. 
 111 TRAC Judge-by-Judge Decisions, supra note 108. 
 112 See Rosenberg, supra note 109 (quoting Professor Karen Musalo, founding director of the Center 
for Gender & Refugee Studies at UC Hastings College of the Law). 
 113 Chasco, supra note 95, at 373. 
 114 Supra Section I.B.1. 
 115 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 351. 
 116 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2019). BIA members apply a “clearly erroneous” standard to IJ 
findings of fact and credibility. Id. 
 117 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN 
ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 10 (2008), https://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d08940.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW8J-F5NP]. 
 118 ANKER, supra note 30, at 30 (describing how courts review BIA factual determinations under a 
substantial evidence test, but review legal conclusions de novo). 
 119 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 327 (“[A] loss in immigration court will likely result in 
removal—a possible death sentence for some asylum seekers whose cases are wrongly denied.”); see 
supra note 8 (discussing the murders of deportees who had been rejected for asylum). 
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case law in the realms of both domestic violence and LGBTQ-based asylum 
claims, and the similarities between the two types of claims. It also analyzes 
the recent decision in Matter of A-B-, which appeared to effect significant 
changes upon how such claims would be handled. 
A. Domestic Violence and LGBTQ Asylum Claims 
Until 2014, the issue of whether domestic violence could sustain an 
asylum claim was an open question.120 Historically, many courts often 
rejected gender-based PSGs because of fears they would open the floodgates 
to too many asylum claims.121 But much of the uncertainty surrounding 
domestic violence-based PSGs was resolved in 2014 in Matter of A-R-C-G-
.122 In this precedential case, the BIA recognized “‘married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship’” as a PSG.123 Domestic 
violence-based asylum applicants could thereafter rely on binding BIA 
precedent to prove their membership in a PSG.124 In A-R-C-G-, the Board 
was able to rely on stipulations from the Obama Department of Homeland 
Security, which conceded that the applicant was a member of a PSG,125 a fact 
which Sessions would later use to justify his decision to overturn the case in 
Matter of A-B-.126 
The history of LGBTQ-based PSGs has been much more 
straightforward than that of domestic violence ones. In 1990, the BIA 
recognized “homosexual men in Cuba” as a PSG, allowing sexual orientation 
to be the basis of PSGs—a decision which AG Reno declared precedential 
 
 120 See NIJC ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 1. 
 121 Id. at 2. In 1999, the BIA rejected a proposed domestic violence-based PSG in a precedential 
decision, Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 2001). The proposed PSG in this case was 
“Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who 
believe that women are to live under male domination.” Id. at 911. The case experienced something of a 
tortured history. NIJC ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 3. It was vacated in 2001 by AG Janet Reno because 
of a proposed Department of Justice rule that would have recognized domestic violence as grounds for a 
PSG, but the rule was never adopted. Id. The applicant’s claim languished for fifteen years until the 
Department of Homeland Security eventually stipulated that she was eligible. Id. Subsequently, some 
courts relied on the Department of Homeland Security brief from Matter of R-A- to conclude that domestic 
violence-based groups were cognizable. DHS’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief, R-A-, 
23 I&N Dec. 694, 18–19 (A.G. 2005) (A 73 753 922), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ 
sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A-%20DHS%20brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW2F-8AAB]. 
Others relied on the BIA’s contrary reasoning in the original R-A- opinion that they were not. R-A-, 
22 I&N Dec. at 914. 
 122 A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 123 Id. at 388–89. 
 124 NIJC ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 5. 
 125 A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N at 395. 
 126 In A-B-, Sessions reasoned that because the BIA in A-R-C-G- relied on DHS stipulations, the 
Board failed to perform the rigorous individualized PSG analysis the law requires. Infra Section II.C. 
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in 1994.127 Subsequently, homosexuality as a valid PSG has gone largely 
uncontested in the courts.128 The Ninth Circuit has been a leader in LGBTQ 
asylum jurisprudence, identifying “all alien homosexuals” as a cognizable 
PSG in 2005.129 While there is currently no case identifying being 
transgender as the basis of a PSG, the Ninth Circuit has identified “gay men 
with female sexual identities in Mexico” as a PSG which, although an 
awkward fit, has been used to argue transgender claims.130 To date, there has 
not been a case recognizing bisexuality as a PSG.131 
B. Similarities Between Domestic Violence and  
LGBTQ-Based Asylum Claims 
Domestic violence and LGBTQ-based asylum claims share many 
similarities which caused concern among advocates about the potential 
impact of Matter of A-B- on LGBTQ asylum claims. Both claims often 
 
 127 Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990). The opinion was adopted as precedent 
in all future proceedings. Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994). 
 128 ANKER, supra note 30, at 497. 
 129 Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 130 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Reyes-Reyes v. 
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 2004); Ellen A. Jenkins, Comment, Taking the Square Peg Out of 
the Round Hole: Addressing the Misclassification of Transgender Asylum Seekers, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. 
L. REV. 67, 77–79 (2009) (discussing the ways in which the “homosexual male” with a “deep female 
identity” formulation of the PSG conflates sexual orientation and gender identity and fails to accurately 
recognize the applicant’s female gender identity). 
 131 IMMIGRATION EQUALITY MANUAL, supra note 79, at 11.2 (click on “11. Immigration Basics: 
Thorny Issues in LGBT/H Asylum Cases” in right sidebar and scroll down to “11.2 Bisexual Claims”). 
See generally Jaclyn Gross, Comment, Neither Here nor There: The Bisexual Struggle for American 
Asylum, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 985 (2018) (discussing the need to change legislation to reflect the immutable 
nature of bisexuality). Although lesbian and gay asylum applicants have not had to struggle to establish 
that sexual orientation is grounds for a cognizable PSG, they do face other unique challenges not common 
to other types of asylum claims, such as proving that they are in fact a member of the PSG. Deborah A. 
Morgan, Not Gay Enough for the Government: Racial and Sexual Stereotypes in Sexual Orientation 
Asylum Cases, 15 L. & SEXUALITY 135, 140–41 (2006). If, for example, an applicant does not conform 
to the IJ’s idea of what a gay person looks or acts like, the IJ might conclude either that the applicant is 
lying, or that they would not face persecution in their home country because their sexual orientation could 
be hidden. See, e.g., Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding the IJ’s adverse 
credibility finds were not supported just because the applicant did not present the IJ’s expectations of 
homosexual characteristics). Proving “gayness” often depends on the IJ’s discretionary credibility 
determination, which is highly subjective and can vary widely depending on the official. Morgan, supra, 
at 141. Other frequent hurdles for LGBTQ asylum seekers include proving that their government was 
unable or unwilling to protect them when their perpetrator was a non-state actor. See, e.g., Malu v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of asylum to a Congolese lesbian 
when the IJ found that the applicant failed to show that the government was unwilling or unable to protect 
her based on a single instance when the police prevented the lynching of a lesbian); Galicia v. Ashcroft, 
396 F.3d 446, 448 (1st Cir. 2005) (denying a gay Guatemalan man’s petition for review because he never 
contacted authorities regarding beatings and verbal abuse by neighbors). But see Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
605 F.3d 941, 943 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding BIA & IJ erred by failing to consider that the government 
may have been unwilling or unable to protect applicant from attacks by neighbors and coworkers). 
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involve what Sessions calls “private violence,” violence committed by non-
state actors that requires a showing of government unwillingness or inability 
to protect.132 Like in domestic violence cases, the persecutors in anti-LGBTQ 
violence cases are often members of the victim’s family.133 It is impossible 
to quantify the magnitude of this problem due to chronic underreporting and 
lack of documentation when survivors do report.134 
In addition, both domestic violence and LGBTQ claims are usually 
based on membership in a PSG, although applicants can bolster both types 
of claims with other grounds such as “political opinion,” when available.135 
While this can be useful tactically to bolster a PSG-based claim,136 it also 
 
 132 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 319 (A.G. 2018). This conception of domestic violence as a “private” 
problem has been frequently debunked by feminist scholars, who point out that it misses the ways in 
which “the convergences between private and public power create intersectional dimensions of social 
control.” Fatma Marouf, Becoming Unconventional: Constricting the ‘Particular Social Group’ Ground 
for Asylum, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 487, 513 (2019) (describing Sessions’s view of domestic violence as 
“antiquated” and citing the work of feminist scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw). 
 133 In a thorough study of violence against lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women in five Asian 
countries, researchers found that despite high rates of anti-gay violence perpetrated by government actors 
such as police, the number one perpetrator of violence against queer women was the family. See THE 
INT’L GAY & LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMM’N, VIOLENCE: THROUGH THE LENS OF LESBIANS, BISEXUAL 
WOMEN AND TRANS PEOPLE IN ASIA 17 (2014), https://www.outrightinternational.org/sites/ 
default/files/LBT_ForUpload0614.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4TL-3UGA] [hereinafter VIOLENCE ASIA]; 
see also OUTRIGHT ACTION INT’L & ARAB FOUND. FOR FREEDOMS & EQUAL., ACTIVISM AND 
RESILIENCE: LGBTQ PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 52 (2014), 
https://www.outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/MENAReport%202018_100918_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S6UE-BX7F] (In a study on Middle Eastern countries, all four countries analyzed 
mentioned the family as a source of anti-LGBTQ violence, including reports of rape, blackmail, detention 
in family homes, conversion therapy, social ostracism, and honor killings.) See also INTER-AMERICAN 
COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., VIOLENCE AGAINST LGBTI PERSONS 173 (2015), http://www.oas.org/ 
en/iachr/reports/pdfs/violencelgbtipersons.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL8Z-ZV98] (discussing various cases 
of family violence against LGBTQ people from around the world, including a Haitian man whose brother 
attacked him with a machete after he came out as gay, a mother in North Carolina who instructed one son 
to “beat[] the gay out” of his brother, and a boy in Peru whose father set him on fire when he found out 
he was living with HIV). Queer women, in particular, are “disproportionately impacted” by violence 
perpetrated by family members. Id. at 156. The family home is also one of the two most common sites of 
violence against LGBTQ children, along with schools. Id. at 171. 
 134 Id. at 16. 
 135 Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1997) (remanding case of a Russian lesbian who 
was active in LGBTQ advocacy and brought claims based on both political opinion and membership in a 
PSG); S-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 1328, 1328 (B.I.A. 2000) (finding a daughter who was beaten by her father 
was persecuted on account of her political opinion because she did not conform to her father’s strict 
Muslim beliefs). See generally Victoria Neilson, Homosexual or Female? Applying Gender-Based 
Asylum Jurisprudence to Lesbian Asylum Claims, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417 (2005) (describing 
emerging differences in the law relating to gender-based and lesbian asylum claims). 
 136 In general, it is strategic for asylum applicants to argue that as many protected grounds as possible 
are applicable to their case, as only one needs to be successful in order to prevail. Ritu Ghai, Deciphering 
Motive: Establishing Sexual Orientation as the “One Central Reason” for Persecution in Asylum Claims, 
43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 521, 538, 540 (2012) (discussing the development of “mixed motive” 
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unfortunately advantages a certain type of asylum seeker: it is often wealthier 
queer people who have the privilege to live an openly gay life and advocate 
for LGBTQ rights in their home country.137 Indeed, use of a “political 
activist”-type narrative can negatively impact less privileged applicants if IJs 
come to expect that “real” gay people are involved in such activities.138 
The two categories also directly overlap in cases of intimate partner 
violence within same-sex relationships. Although domestic violence is 
typically thought of as a heterosexual problem involving male aggressors 
and female victims, intimate partner violence frequently occurs in same-sex 
relationships as well.139 Survivors of intimate partner violence within same-
sex relationships face additional challenges when compared with their 
heterosexual counterparts. Especially in countries where homosexuality is 
criminalized or heavily stigmatized, seeking help from the authorities or civil 
society organizations risks “outing.”140 Many survivors have also had highly 
negative experiences with the police and are reluctant to turn to them for 
assistance.141 Lesbian and bisexual women are especially at risk of suffering 
this type of violence; in addition to domestic violence within same-sex 
relationships, many lesbian and bisexual women are forced into heterosexual 
marriages by their families or social norms and then abused by their 
husbands.142 
Finally, scholars have noted that the asylum system was established in 
the wake of World War II and thus conceptualized the prototypical refugee 
 
claims in which persecutors have more than one motive for their actions and affirming that a protected 
ground need only be “one central reason” motivating the persecution). 
 137 Morgan, supra note 131, at 158. 
 138 Mockeviciene v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 237 F. App’x 569, 572, 574 (11th Cir. 2007) (denying petition 
for reversal of IJ’s finding that a Lithuanian lesbian was not credible where the IJ “did not believe she 
was actually a lesbian” due in part to her not joining groups “that involved lesbian activities” and not 
having had a lesbian partner during her four years in the U.S., deeming her “at best . . . a non-practicing 
lesbian”). 
 139 VIOLENCE ASIA, supra note 133, at 17 (finding “an unexpectedly high occurrence of intimate 
partner violence” in study of anti-LBT violence in Asia); The National Intimate Partner and Sexual 
Violence Survey, NISVS: An Overview of 2010 Findings on Victimization by Sexual Orientation, CTR. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL 1 (2010), 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cdc_nisvs_victimization_final-a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7KM9-GAZF] (reporting findings of a national survey showing that LGBTQ people 
experienced intimate partner violence at an equal or higher rate as compared to self-identified 
heterosexuals). 
 140 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on Protection Against Violence 
and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/43 (May 
11, 2018), available at https://undocs.org/A/HRC/38/43 [https://perma.cc/DF6T-9NT9] [hereinafter 
Independent Expert Report]. 
 141 See, e.g., VIOLENCE ASIA, supra note 133, at 12. 
 142 See, e.g., id. at 31; Independent Expert Report, supra note 140, at 8. 
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as a cisgender, straight, white man fleeing European political persecution.143 
The modern asylum system that grew out of these roots still contains many 
biases, such as more easily recognizing forms of persecution that are 
typically suffered in the public sphere domains dominated by men—like 
vocal political dissent—than the types of violations that befall primarily 
women, such as sexual assault.144 This bias towards recognizing types of 
persecution most commonly suffered by cisgender, straight men negatively 
affects domestic violence-based and LGBTQ-based asylum claims 
equally.145 
C. Matter of A-B- 
Matter of A-B- involved the asylum claim of a woman from El Salvador 
who fled to the U.S. to escape horrific domestic violence perpetrated by her 
husband over many years.146 She posited “El Salvadoran women who are 
unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have children in 
common” as her PSG, which closely parallels the BIA-recognized group 
from Matter of A-R-C-G-, “married women in Guatemala who are unable to 
leave their relationship.”147 Ms. A-B- had the bad luck to have her claim 
assigned to Judge V. Stuart Couch at the Charlotte Immigration Court, who 
is considered by immigration advocates to be particularly hostile to asylum 
claims with a 92.1% overall denial rate.148 Judge Couch rejected Ms. A-B-’s 
claim on nearly every element.149 On appeal, the BIA reversed on all grounds, 
citing A-R-C-G-.150 On remand, Judge Couch refused to implement the BIA’s 
decision and attempted to recertify it to the BIA, supposedly based on other 
federal circuits reaching adverse findings on domestic violence claims, in a 
 
 143 Bowmani, supra note 81, at 14. 
 144 Id. at 15–16. 
 145 See generally Neilson, supra note 135 (discussing that persecution of lesbians often occurs in the 
private sphere and comparing the challenges applicants face in proving lesbian asylum claims to those 
faced in proving gender-based asylum claims). 
 146 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 320–21 (A.G. 2018); Backgrounder and Briefing on Matter of  
A-B-, U.C. HASTINGS CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDS. (Aug. 2018), https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ 
matter-b/backgrounder-and-briefing-matter-b [https://perma.cc/G6WU-YSH4] [hereinafter CGRS 
Backgrounder]. Ms. A-B-’s husband beat, raped, and threatened to kill her frequently. When she  
moved to another town and sought a divorce, her husband tracked her down and threatened to kill her 
once again. Id. 
 147 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 321; A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 392 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 148 Judge V. Stuart Couch, TRACIMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/ 
judgereports/00394CHL/index.html [https://perma.cc/U29X-GNQW]. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id.; see also A-B- (B.I.A. Dec. 8, 2016), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1omC8I1KHLk-
77hqqOY2XuLZqjmICVHLZ/edit [https://perma.cc/NF48-2LAP] (unpublished opinion, redacted and 
published by counsel). 
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striking demonstration of the absence of the rule of law in the asylum 
system.151 
At this point, Sessions stepped in and certified the case to himself, 
asking for briefing on the following question: “Whether, and under what 
circumstances, being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a 
cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for 
asylum . . . .”152 The Department of Homeland Security expressed confusion, 
given that it believed this question had already been answered by BIA 
precedent, and requested clarification, which Sessions refused.153 Of the 
twelve amicus briefs submitted in response to the question, eleven were in 
favor of leaving the BIA’s decision in A-B- in place.154 The one brief that 
favored overturning the decision and eliminating the domestic violence-
based particular social group articulated in A-R-C-G- was filed by the 
Immigration Reform Law Institute,155 an arm of the anti-immigrant 
 
 151 NIJC ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 7 (citing Judge V. Stuart Couch, supra note 148). 
 152 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 323. 
 153 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 247, 249 (A.G. 2018) (“DHS requests clarification on the ground that ‘this 
question has already been answered, at least in part, by the Board and its prior precedent.’”). Sixteen 
former immigration judges and members of the BIA submitted an amicus brief protesting that Sessions’ 
use of his self-referral power under these procedural circumstances was impermissible. See Brief Amici 
Curiae of Sixteen Former Immigration Judges and Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals Urging 
Vacatur of Referral Order and in Support of Respondent at 8, A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), 
available at https://www.aila.org/infonet/amicus-brief-matter-of-a-b- [https://perma.cc/AZS8-9JTU]. 
 154 Amici Curiae Brief of Gonzalez Olivieri, LLC, Immigration Counseling Center, Inc., and Fiel 
Houston, Inc. at 9, A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Brief for The American Bar Association as 
Amicus Curiae at 21, A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Brief of Amici Curiae The Catholic Legal 
Immigration Network, Inc., Benedictine Sisters of The Fed’n of St. Scholastica, Conference of 
Benedictine Prioresses, Conference of Major Superiors of Men, Hias, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee 
Service, National Council of Jewish Women, National Justice for Our Neighbors, Unitarian Universalist 
Service Comm., United Methodist Immigration Task Force, and World Relief at 19–20, A-B-, 27 I&N 
Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Brief of Amicus Curiae David B. Gardner at 12, A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316  
(A.G. 2018); Brief of Amici Curiae The Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, The  
Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Human Rights First, and Kids in Need of Defense at 21, A-B-, 27 I&N 
Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Law Professors at 23, A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 
(A.G. 2018); Brief of Amicus Curiae Innovation Law Lab at 33, A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae The National Immigrant Justice Ctr. at 31, A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); 
Brief Amici Curiae of Sixteen Former Immigration Judges, supra note 153, at 21; Corrected Brief of 
Tahirih Justice Ctr., The Asian Pacific Institute on Gender-Based Violence, Asista Immigration 
Assistance, and Casa De Esperanza as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent A-B- at 34, A-B-, 27 I&N 
Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae and Brief of the George Washington 
University Immigration Clinic as Amicus Curiae in Response to Amicus Invitation Matter of A-B-, at 19, 
A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
 155 Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae and Supplemental Brief of the Immigration Reform Law 
Institute at 4, A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), available at http://immigrationreformlawinstitute.org/ 
Docs/Matter_of_A_B_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C2D-YQZQ] 
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organization Federation for American Immigration Reform, which has been 
classified as a hate group with ties to white supremacist organizations.156 
Matter of A-B- was the latest example of the Trump Administration’s 
aggressive use of the AG’s certification power, which is unprecedented in 
modern history.157 In 2018 alone, the power was used to refer ten cases for 
AG review, eight certified by Sessions and two by then-Acting AG Matthew 
Whitaker.158 This is equivalent to the total number of AG referrals in the prior 
ten years combined.159 
 
 156 Federation for American Immigration Reform, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/ 
fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/federation-american-immigration-reform [https://perma.cc/93UA-
FMMJ]. 
 157 See infra Figure 1. 
 158 AG/BIA Precedent Listing, supra note 85. Whitaker took over as Acting AG in November 2018. 
Given the open questions about the constitutionality of Mr. Whitaker’s appointment to the role of Acting 
AG, his use of the certification power is particularly alarming. John E. Bies, Matthew Whitaker's 
Appointment as Acting Attorney General: Three Lingering Questions, LAWFARE  
(Nov. 8, 2018, 10:04 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/matthew-whitakers-appointment-acting-
attorney-general-three-lingering-questions [https://perma.cc/8T3V-5VAD]. 
 159 AG/BIA Precedent Listing, supra note 85; see infra Figure 1. Observers have noted that the 
Trump DOJ’s use of this power has differed from predecessors’ not only in frequency but also in kind. 
“The decisions are different from those of other administrations, in that they are self-certified through 
procedural irregularity, are decided based on issues entirely different than those presented before the IJs 
and the BIA, and upend what had been settled issues of law that were not being questioned by either party 
to the action.” Chase, supra note 93. 
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FIGURE 1: USE OF THE AG REFERRAL POWER OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS160 
 
As asylum advocates feared, when Sessions released his final decision 
in Matter of A-B- on June 11, 2018, he vacated the BIA’s decision in Matter 
of A-B- and overturned Matter of A-R-C-G-.161 The New York Times and other 
major publications ran headlines announcing that Sessions had declared 
domestic violence and gang violence would no longer be grounds for 
asylum.162 And indeed Sessions stated in his opinion that “[g]enerally, claims 
by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by 
non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.”163 However, a careful 
reading shows that the decision did not go as far as many domestic violence 
and asylum advocates initially feared—and perhaps not as far as AG 
Sessions would have liked. The only actual holding of Matter of A-B- is that 
it overturned Matter of A-R-C-G-, meaning that “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” is no longer available 
as a precedential PSG.164 This essentially turns back the clock to before 2014, 
when domestic violence-based asylum applicants had no BIA precedent to 
rely on, but could still apply for and qualify for asylum; they just needed to 
 
 160 Data compiled from AG/BIA Precedent Listing, supra note 85. For a listing of all past volumes 
of AG and BIA decisions, see Agency Decisions: AG/BIA Decisions Listing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/ag-bia-decisions[https://perma.cc/5HUK-JTH4]. 
 161 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 316–17 (A.G. 2018). 
 162 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 163 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 320. 
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prove their membership in a particular social group.165 The rest of the 
decision is merely a restatement of preexisting standards, surrounded by 
copious, but ultimately nonbinding, dicta that attempts to cast doubt on 
domestic violence, gang-related, and other non-state actor claims.166 
The language of the opinion itself makes clear that Sessions did not 
create a categorical bar to domestic violence, gang violence, or other non-
state actor-based claims.167 Indeed, Sessions did not have the power to create 
a categorical bar to certain types of claims. A foundational principle of 
asylum law is that asylum claims must be decided on a case-by-case basis.168 
While the Attorney General may have the power to overrule prior BIA 
precedent, he does not have the power to rewrite international law. 
Furthermore, despite his seemingly substantive rationale, Sessions 
overruled A-R-C-G- on essentially technical grounds. He found error with 
the fact that in A-R-C-G-, the BIA relied on Department of Homeland 
Security stipulations on issues of law, including the recognition of the PSG, 
rather than performing its own analysis to determine whether the posited 
PSG met the “particularity” and “social distinction” tests to establish a 
cognizable PSG.169 Thus, A-B- does not stand for the proposition that PSGs 
similar to the ones articulated in A-R-C-G- and A-B- can never be cognizable 
PSGs. If applicants engage in the proper analysis to show IJs that the specific 
domestic violence and gang violence-related PSGs in their case are particular 
and socially distinct, A-B- does not state that those asylum claims cannot be 
valid.170  
Although at several points in the opinion, Sessions may have appeared 
to create a heightened standard for non-state actor claims in general, upon 
closer examination he does not. For instance, he stated that “[a]n applicant 
seeking to establish persecution based on violent conduct of a private actor 
‘must show more than [the government’s] difficulty . . . controlling private 
 
 165 See supra notes 120–124 and accompanying text. 
 166 NIJC ADVISORY, supra note 4 at 8; see, e.g. A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 344–45.  
 167 Sessions explicitly stated, “I do not decide that violence inflicted by non-governmental actors 
may never serve as the basis for asylum . . . based on membership in a particular social group.” A-B-, 
27 I&N Dec. at 320. Also, he qualified his sweeping statement about domestic violence and gang violence 
with “[g]enerally.” Id. 
 168 Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“The particular kind of group characteristic that 
will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”); NIJC ADVISORY, 
supra note 3, at 14. 
 169 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 333–34. 
 170 NIJC ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 14. It is well-established that PSG determinations are fact-
dependent and must be made on a case-by-case basis. Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233 (“The particular kind 
of group characteristic that will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-
case basis.”); M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Social group determinations are made on a 
case-by-case basis.”). 
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behavior.’ . . . The applicant must show that the government condoned the 
private actions ‘or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect 
the victims.’”171 However, “condoned” or “helplessness” is essentially 
synonymous with “unwilling” and “unable.”172 The Seventh Circuit, which 
originated this language, has since used the language of “condoned” and 
“helplessness” interchangeably with “unable or unwilling,” indicating that 
this is not a heightened standard.173 Sessions also stated that applicants in 
non-state actor cases need to show that “government protection from such 
harm . . . is so lacking that their persecutors’ actions can be attributed to the 
government.”174 However, this assertion is merely dicta because it is included 
only in the introductory section, not the actual opinion. The same limitation 
applies to his comment that “there may be exceptional circumstances when 
victims of private criminal activity could meet these requirements.”175 
Tellingly, Sessions repeated the “unwilling or unable” language at several 
points in the opinion, indicating that he has not changed any standards but 
has merely rearticulated the preexisting, well-established ones.176 Even if 
Sessions had wanted to chip away at the viability of non-state actor claims, 
he could not, as this prong is included in the definition of refugee in the INA 
and under international law.177 
Sessions also spent considerable time in the opinion discussing the 
requirements for establishing a PSG, but once again essentially restates 
existing precedent. He stated that PSGs must be defined with particularity 
and social distinction—which was previously established178—and that PSGs 
 
 171 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 337 (first quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted); then quoting Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 
2000)). 
 172 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 337. Sessions took this language from a Seventh Circuit case involving a 
non-state actor persecutor. Galina, 213 F.3d at 957. In Galina, the court noted that applicants in cases 
with non-governmental persecutors must prove that government actors “condoned [the persecution] or at 
least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims,” but supported this proposition with 
four cases which employed the traditional “unwilling or unable” to control language. Id. at 958 (citing 
Aguilar–Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 573 (1st Cir. 1999); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 735 n.1 (9th Cir. 
1999) (en banc) (superseded by statute); Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 1997); Hengan v. INS, 
79 F.3d 60, 62 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 173 Galina, 213 F.3d at 958; NIJC ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 24. The government itself argued that 
“condoned or helpless” did not create a heightened standard in its pleadings in a different case when 
defending itself against charges that its changes to CFI standards were “arbitrary or capricious.” Grace v. 
Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 127 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 174 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 317. 
 175 Id.; NIJC ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 9. 
 176 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 317, 318, 320; NIJC ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 10. 
 177 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Sixteen Former Immigration 
Judges, supra note 153, at 16–17. 
 178 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 335; M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014). 
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cannot be circular, meaning the group cannot be defined by the harm 
suffered,179 another requirement already established by prior case law.180 
One of the most troubling parts of A-B- is Sessions’s language about 
discretion. Sessions reminded asylum adjudicators that “a favorable exercise 
of discretion is a discrete requirement,”181 and encouraged them to consider 
discretionary factors, including the “circumvention of orderly refugee 
procedures” and whether the applicant could have remained in any third 
countries she passed through on her way to the U.S.182 This language appears 
to encourage asylum adjudicators to use their discretion to reject asylum 
seekers with otherwise valid claims who cross the border illegally, despite 
the fact that such discretionary denials are typically rare.183 While manner of 
entry has been recognized as a potential discretionary factor, the BIA has 
stated that if an applicant has established a valid asylum claim, “the danger 
of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most egregious adverse 
factors.”184 
In short, much of the damage caused by the opinion itself concerns how 
it was perceived rather than the law it laid down.185 Although the opinion 
does not establish a new standard for the “unable or unwilling” element, its 
focus on this term and on the role of discretion may make it more likely that 
adjudicators will increase their focus upon and skepticism of this element of 
asylum claims.186 
III. THE IMPACT OF MATTER OF A-B- 
This Part examines the impact that Matter of A-B- has had on the asylum 
system. This Part begins by tracing the observable effects of the decision. It 
 
 179 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 335. For example, “women who are victims of domestic violence” would 
not be a proper PSG, because the victims are not persecuted because they are victims of domestic 
violence. 
 180 M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 236 n.11. The fact that any PSG needs to be clearly delineated on the 
record was also previously established in Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, as was the fact that adjudicators 
must consider whether there was a possibility of internal relocation. 27 I&N Dec. 189, 189, 191 (B.I.A. 
2018) (denying the appeal of a Honduran mother because she presented a different PSG than the one 
initially argued before the IJ). 
 181 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 345 n.12; see also supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text. 
 182 A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 345 n.12. 
 183 Aschenbrenner, supra note 102, at 598. This move is consistent with the Trump Administration’s 
unsuccessful attempt in November 2018 to categorically bar asylum seekers who enter the country 
illegally from asylum eligibility via presidential proclamation, which was struck down in August 2019. 
O.A. v. Trump, No. 18-2718 (RDM), 2019 WL 3536334, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2019). 
 184 Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467, 474 (B.I.A. 1987) (superseded by statute). 
 185 NIJC ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 1. 
 186 Id. at 24. 
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then examines the potential impact of Matter of A-B- on LGBTQ asylum 
claims. 
A. The Impact of Matter of A-B- So Far 
Because of the nature of the asylum system, in which many decisions 
are not documented or published, it can be difficult to quantify the full impact 
of Matter of A-B-. What follows is an overview of what impact can be 
observed. First is an analysis of the BIA and court of appeals decisions that 
have cited to Matter of A-B- as of July 2019,187 which identifies several 
trends, all of which support the fact that, doctrinally speaking, Matter of 
A-B- did not have as severe an impact as asylum advocates initially feared. 
Nonetheless, although the text of the decision leaves much of asylum 
doctrine unchanged, the case has had a significant negative impact on asylum 
seekers because of the lack of rule of law in the asylum system. The USCIS 
Guidelines—the implementation of which has been halted by a preliminary 
injunction—ordered that A-B- be applied at the credible fear interview stage 
and would have severely limited the prospects of many asylum seekers 
advancing past that stage.188 In addition, statistical evidence shows that the 
release of Matter of A-B- coincided with a spike in asylum denials, and 
anecdotal evidence indicates that some immigration judges have construed 
A-B- to have broader implications than the BIA and court of appeals 
decisions indicate, causing them to reject more cases. 
1. BIA Cases 
None of the handful of post-A-B- BIA decisions that cite the opinion 
were designated as precedential, but they are useful for gaining a sense of 
how the BIA is applying Matter of A-B- so far, and whether that decision is 
having an impact on asylum claims. First, several cases cited to dicta from 
A-B-, but the decision did not appear to affect the outcome of the claims, 
which instead failed on other grounds.189 Second, in several cases the BIA 
 
 187 Cases were identified using Westlaw’s “Citing References” feature.  
 188 See infra Section III.A.3. 
 189 See, e.g., Maria Ren-Lopez, 2019 WL 2160109, at *1 (B.I.A. Jan. 31, 2019) (citing A-B-, 27 I&N 
Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018), for the proposition that “generally” domestic violence is not grounds for 
asylum, but ultimately upholding the IJ’s order of removal because the respondent failed to actually file 
an application for asylum, despite claiming fear to return to her home country). In several cases that were 
decided upon motions to reopen proceedings after applicants failed to appear for their original hearings, 
the asylum claim failed because the applicants did not show that conditions had changed in their home 
country, which is a required showing for a motion to reopen. See, e.g., Karla Aracely Hernandez-
Calderon, 2018 WL 8062932, at *1–2 (B.I.A. Dec. 21, 2018) (citing A-B-’s “[g]enerally . . . gang 
violence . . . will not qualify” language but denying relief because respondent’s motion to reopen was 
both time and number-barred, and respondent failed to prove a change in country conditions, 27 I&N 
Dec. at 320); Amilcar Rene Erazo-Vasquez, 2018 WL 5921037, at *1 (B.I.A. Sept. 28, 2018) (citing the 
same language but denying relief because respondent’s motion was untimely and because respondent 
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indicated that applicants could no longer rely on Matter of A-R-C-G- as 
precedent.190 Third, multiple cases cited to A-B- for a proposition that was 
already supported in prior case law, often citing other cases as well.191 
Notably lacking in the publicly available BIA cases that have cited 
A-B- so far is any suggestion from the BIA that Matter of A-B- created a 
categorical bar on domestic violence or gang violence ever supporting a 
claim for asylum. They also did not indicate that they interpreted Matter of 
A-B- as establishing a heightened standard for the “unable or unwilling to 
protect” element. In fact, in none of these cases was Matter of A-B- outcome-
determinative; the claims failed on procedural grounds or on a failure to 
establish elements that were already part of well-established asylum law 
prior to Matter of A-B-. 
2. Court of Appeals Decisions 
A review of the circuit court of appeals decisions that have applied 
A-B- so far also reveals several trends. First, in the immediate aftermath of 
A-B-, courts of appeals frequently simply remanded the case to the BIA to 
 
failed to establish changed country conditions that would excuse the untimeliness); Marvin Wilfredo 
Menjivar-Orellana, 2018 WL 4611484, at *2 (B.I.A. Aug. 3, 2018) (citing the same language to indicate 
that the applicant would have no incentive to appear at his 2012 removal hearing based on potential 
eligibility for asylum); Ramon Elias-Menjivar, 2018 WL 4611489, at *1–2 (B.I.A. Aug. 1, 2018) (citing 
to A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 320, that “‘[t]he mere fact that a country may have problems effectively policing 
certain crimes—such as domestic violence or gang violence—or that certain populations are more likely 
to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum claim” but ultimately rejecting the appeal because 
the applicant did not establish a change in country conditions, failed to delineate the contours of his 
particular social group, and did not tie the general increase in gang violence in El Salvador to his specific 
circumstances); Melva Danira Mejia-Banegas, 2018 WL 4611496, at *1–2 (B.I.A. July 30, 2018) (citing 
from A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 337, that “‘the government [must] condone[] the private actions or at least 
demonstrate[] a complete helplessness to protect the victims’” without indicating that the Board 
considered this to be a higher standard than “unwilling or unable” to protect, and rather denying the claim 
because the applicant failed to provide evidence to satisfy that prong, and regardless failed to show a 
“change in country conditions” (internal citations omitted in original)). 
 190 See, e.g., Mirna Yaneth Lopez-Marroquin, 2018 WL 5921076, at *2 (B.I.A. Sept. 17, 2018) 
(denying applicant’s motion to reopen proceedings because she relied on A-R-C-G-, but not indicating 
that her domestic violence-based PSG could never be cognizable); Maria Emma Orellana Carranza, 
2018 WL 4002314, at *1 (B.I.A., June 25, 2018) (noting that the applicant could not use Matter of  
A-R-C-G- as an “exceptional circumstance” warranting sua sponte reopening of claim). 
 191 See Ilder Serrano-Melgar, 2019 WL 2613163, at *2 (B.I.A. Apr. 5, 2019) (citing A-B- along with 
Seventh Circuit precedent for the proposition that fear of generalized gang violence is not sufficient to 
establish an asylum claim); Milton Javier Solano, 2018 WL 4692828, at *2 (B.I.A. Aug. 31, 2018) (citing 
A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 316, for the well-established proposition that “[f]ear of criminal violence by itself” 
is not sufficient to establish an asylum claim); Braulio Juarez-Chilel, 2018 WL 4002273, at *2 (B.I.A. 
July 11, 2018) (citing A-B- among multiple other BIA decisions in dismissing an appeal because the 
applicant indicated only that he feared being extorted by gangs because he had money, not on account of 
membership in any particular social group). 
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apply A-B- without much discussion of how it might affect the outcome.192 
Second, in several cases, the circuits indicated that Matter of A-R-C-G- is no 
longer precedent, but that fact did not affect the outcomes.193 Similarly, in 
several cases, the circuits quoted dicta from A-B-, but A-B- seemingly did 
not affect the outcomes.194 And in many cases the circuits indicated that 
A-B- was consistent with their preexisting case law.195 
 
 192 See, e.g., Padilla-Maldonado v. Att’y Gen. United States, 751 F. App’x 263, 268–69 (3d Cir. 
2018) (remanding to the BIA to apply A-B- in order to determine whether respondent’s membership in 
the posited group is cognizable); Moncada v. Sessions, 751 F. App’x 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2018) (remanding 
because A-B- offered “substantial new guidance on the viability of asylum ‘claims by aliens pertaining 
to . . . gang violence’” since the IJ and BIA’s rulings (quoting A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 320)). 
 193 In Padilla-Maldonado v. Att’y Gen. United States, the Third Circuit was quite explicit that while 
the applicant could no longer rely on Matter of A-R-C-G- to establish her PSG, that did not mean she 
could not still establish that she is a member of a cognizable PSG, stating that “[w]hile the overruling of 
A-R-C-G- weakens Padilla-Maldonado’s case, it does not automatically defeat her claim that she is a 
member of a cognizable particular social group.” 751 F. App’x at 268; see also Rivas-Durán v. Barr, 
927 F.3d 26, 31 n.1 (1st Cir. 2019) (recognizing that A-R-C-G- was overruled by A-B-, but finding that 
fact irrelevant where the BIA found the applicant failed to prove membership in her proposed PSG even 
while A-R-C-G- was still in effect); W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202, 210–11 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding 
A-B- overruling A-R-C-G- was irrelevant in denying government responsibility for attorneys’ fees where 
government was “substantially justified” in finding an applicant failed under pre-A-B- standards); 
Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 33, 40 n.6 (1st Cir. 2018) (indicating that while applicant had 
misconstrued the holding of A-R-C-G-, her interpretation was irrelevant, even if correct, because 
A-B- overruled A-R-C-G-); S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. United States, 894 F.3d 535, 545, 550 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(indicating that it was inappropriate to rely on A-R-C-G- to establish a PSG because it had been overruled 
and confirmed that PSG determination must be made on a case-by-case basis); Tacam-Garcia v. Whitaker, 
744 Fed. App’x 226, 227 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (denying appeal because applicant relied on  
A-R-C-G- to establish her PSG, but even if she had established PSG she failed to establish nexus or that 
the government was unwilling or unable to control); Najera v. Whitaker, 745 F. App’x 670, 671 (8th Cir. 
2018) (noting that applicant’s proposed PSG “may not be cognizable” given the overruling of A-R-C-G- 
but finding this fact irrelevant where the applicant failed to establish her membership in it even if it  
were valid). 
 194 See, e.g., Saravia v. Att’y Gen. United States, 905 F.3d 729, 739 n.49 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 320, that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang 
violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum,” but ultimately remanding 
on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the case); Moncada, 751 F. App’x at 118 (quoting 
A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 337, that “private criminals are motivated more often by greed or vendettas than by 
an intent to overcome the protected characteristic of the victim,” but ultimately remanding). 
 195 For example, in Padilla-Maldonado, the Third Circuit indicated that upon remand the IJ should 
determine whether “Salvadoran women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” is cognizable 
according to the parameters of A-B-. 751 F. App’x at 268–69. The court then described those parameters 
entirely in terms consistent with pre-A-B- asylum standards, including the normal “unwilling or unable 
to protect” standard. Id. at 266; see also Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 166 n.9 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(explicitly quoting A-B that “[t]he mere fact that a country may have problems effectively policing certain 
crimes . . . cannot itself establish an asylum claim” as “consistent with [the First Circuit’s] precedent” 
concerning government unwillingness or inability to protect in non-state actor claims.); Gutierrez v. Att’y 
Gen. United States, 747 Fed. App’x 106, 108 n.2 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding proposed domestic violence-
related PSG was not perceived socially distinct under Matter of M-E-V-G-, and therefore it was not 
necessary to consider the effect, “if any,” of A-B-); Patzan v. Att’y Gen. United States, 754 Fed. App’x 
128, 130 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding that proposed gang-related PSG was not particular or socially distinct 
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Several circuits explicitly made clear that domestic violence or gang 
violence claims could still be valid.196 For instance, in Juan-Pedro v. 
Sessions, the Sixth Circuit remanded because the BIA failed to consider 
evidence that an attack by gang members was motivated by the applicant’s 
ethnicity.197 They concluded that Matter of A-B- was “not relevant” because 
the IJ in Juan-Pedro “expressly found” that the applicant had established her 
government’s inability to protect her had she gone to them for help.198 This 
outcome clearly indicates that the Sixth Circuit does not believe Matter of 
A-B- has created a heightened standard for non-state actor claims and that 
gang violence claims can still be valid as long as a protected ground is “one 
central reason” motivating persecution.199 In addition, the Ninth Circuit 
remanded Ticas-Guillen v. Whitaker because in the past the court had 
recognized that gender and nationality alone can form the basis of a PSG, so 
“women in El Salvador” may be sufficient, demonstrating a rejection of any 
categorical bars on domestic violence claims.200 
The Eleventh Circuit is an exception to the general consensus that 
Matter of A-B- has not significantly changed the legal standards applied to 
 
under Matter of M-E-V-G-); Gonzalez-Solares v. Whitaker, 742 F. App’x 277, 277 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(proposed PSGs of “persons subject to extortion demands in Guatemala” defined the group in terms of 
the harm suffered, in violation of preexisting precedent established in Matter of M-E-V-G-); Reyes v. 
Sessions, 750 Fed. App’x 656, 659 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding that “female victims of domestic violence” 
and “females in El Salvador” were not cognizable PSGs under preexisting precedent, not because of 
A-B-). 
 196 See, e.g., Twum v. Barr, 930 F.3d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2019) (emphasizing that the BIA “does not 
expressly or impliedly conclude that domestic abuse is not a cognizable type of harm, nor does its opinion 
suggest a finding that Twum failed to link the [domestic violence] suffered to one of the enumerated 
statutory grounds” where the BIA’s decision discussed only the amount of time that had elapsed since the 
harm occurred, not the type of harm); Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 252–55 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(remanding to apply A-B-, but spending considerable time highlighting the ways in which the IJ failed to 
conduct a proper analysis of whether “unmarried mothers living under control of gangs” could be a viable 
PSG, and urging the BIA “on this fourth attempt, to address Alvarez Lagos’s claims fully and with 
attention to all of the relevant evidence”). 
 197 740 F. App’x 467, 472 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 198 Id. at 472 n.1. 
 199 Id.; see also Aguilar-Gonzalez v. Barr, No. 18-3891, 2019 WL 2896442, at *3 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(per curiam) (noting that an indigenous woman failed to provide any evidence connecting her domestic 
abuse to her ethnicity, but not indicating that this type of claim was categorically barred); Rosales Justo, 
895 F.3d at 163–64 (remanding because the BIA erred in determining that it was “clearly erroneous” to 
determine that the applicant failed to demonstrate the Mexican government was unable or unwilling to 
protect him simply because the government investigated his son’s murder by members of an organized 
crime group. The First Circuit distinguished the evidence in A-B- and other cases concerning government 
inability or unwillingness to protect from this case, indicating that the standard had not been heightened, 
and claims concerning organized crime were still eligible, provided all elements are established). 
 200 744 Fed. App’x 410 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Silvestre-Mendoza v. Sessions, 729 F. App’x 597, 
598 (9th Cir. 2018) (remanding for consideration of whether “Guatemalan women” is a socially distinct 
PSG under Ninth Circuit precedent).  
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asylum claims.201 In Munguia-Mejia v. U.S. Attorney General, the asylum 
applicant, who applied prior to A-B-, posited “women in a de facto union 
who are unable to leave the relationship with their male partner” as her 
particular social group, relying on A-R-C-G-.202 The immigration judge 
denied her application for various reasons, including a finding that she was 
not credible.203 The BIA declined to consider her challenge to the IJ’s adverse 
credibility determination because Matter of A-B- “independently foreclosed” 
her asylum claim.204 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the applicant’s 
argument that the BIA’s failure to consider her credibility claim was a denial 
of her due process rights, agreeing that her claim was foreclosed by Matter 
of A-B-.205 The court stated the applicant “cannot show and does not argue 
that remand would result in a different outcome in light of Matter of A-B-, 
which would preclude the BIA or IJ from concluding that her proposed group 
was legally cognizable.”206 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit appears to have 
concluded that after A-B-, PSGs similar to the one in A-R-C-G- can never be 
cognizable, a departure from other circuits’ interpretations.207 
Still, with the exception of the Eleventh Circuit, none of the other court 
of appeals cases discussed previously that have cited A-B- indicate a belief 
that the case created a categorical bar on domestic violence claims or a 
heightened standard for “unable or unwilling” to protect. Circuit court 
interpretations of the opinion will become clearer with more time once courts 
no longer need simply to remand the cases that were appealed before A-B-’s 
release.208 
 
 201 Munguia-Mejia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 2019 WL 3064490, at *1–2 (11th Cir. July 12, 2019) (per 
curiam). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at *1. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at *3. 
 206 Id. 
 207 The applicant also argued that the BIA should have remanded her case to the IJ to consider 
whether her PSG could be cognizable after A-B-, and that the BIA erred by concluding that her claim was 
precluded by A-B-. The Eleventh Circuit declined to consider these claims for lack of jurisdiction because 
the applicant failed to exhaust them before the BIA. Id. at *2. 
 208 Prospects for domestic violence and other non-state actor claims look the most optimistic in the 
Ninth Circuit, but language in the Sixth Circuit opinion is also promising. As of this writing, there has 
not been a Seventh Circuit decision applying A-B- yet, but that will likely also be a favorable circuit, as 
Galina is a Seventh Circuit decision and therefore the court is aware that “condoned or helpless” does 
not create a higher burden than “unable or unwilling.” Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000). 
In addition, the Seventh Circuit has historically had one of the highest remand rates (followed by the 
Ninth). Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 363 fig.46. Prospects are the most negative for asylum 
seekers in the Eleventh Circuit following its decision in Munguia-Mejia. 2019 WL 3064490, at *1. There 
is also cause for concern in the Second Circuit, where the court indicated that A-B- might provide 
“substantial new guidance” on the viability of gang-related claims. Moncada v. Sessions, 751 F. App’x 
116, 118 (2d Cir. 2018). 
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3. Agency Guidelines 
While most BIA and Court of Appeals decisions might indicate that 
A-B-’s impact has been relatively mild, its impact at the implementation 
stage has been far more severe. On July 11, 2018, USCIS issued guidelines 
on how officers should apply A-B-. The guidelines instructed all USCIS 
personnel to apply the reasoning from A-B- at the credible fear interview 
stage.209 The guidelines cited much of the dicta from A-B- that asylum 
advocates found alarming, and placed the following dicta in boldface type: 
In general, in light of the above standards, claims based on membership in a 
putative particular social group defined by the members’ vulnerability to harm 
of domestic violence or gang violence committed by non-government actors 
will not establish the basis for asylum, refugee status, or a credible or reasonable 
fear of persecution.210 
The ACLU filed a lawsuit in August 2018, Grace v. Whitaker,211 
specifically challenging the changes to credible fear standards articulated in 
the USCIS Guidelines, arguing that the effect of all of the guidelines taken 
together was “to distort the credible fear process beyond recognition.”212 In 
December 2018, a federal judge granted the ACLU’s request for a permanent 
injunction against enforcing the changes to CFI standards in the USCIS 
 
 209 Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Guidance for Processing Reasonable 
Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, and Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B- 1 (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-guidance-processing-fear-matter-of-a-b- [https://perma.cc/9SYE-
B4AE] [hereinafter USCIS Guidelines]. Prior to the release of these guidelines, Sessions had publicly 
lamented the low credible fear threshold and expressed a desire to heighten the standard, stating “[w]e 
can elevate the threshold standard of proof in credible fear interviews.” Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., 
Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (Oct. 12, 2017), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-
immigration-review [https://perma.cc/QYM5-43MD] (“The system is being gamed. The credible fear 
process was intended to be a lifeline for persons facing serious persecution. But it has become an easy 
ticket to illegal entry into the United States . . . . We also have dirty immigration lawyers who are 
encouraging their otherwise unlawfully present clients to make false claims of asylum providing them 
with the magic words needed to trigger the credible fear process.”). 
 210 USCIS Guidelines, supra note 209, at 6 (this Note cites to portions of the USCIS Guidelines that 
have been redacted in its original form). The guidelines also stated that asylum officers should ignore any 
federal circuit case law that is inconsistent with A-B-, and should only look to the federal circuit where 
the CFI took place, despite the fact that the prior rule was that asylum officers should apply the law of 
the federal circuit with the most favorable precedent. Id. at 9; Petitioner’s Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at 20, Grace v. Whitaker 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-
01853) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Complaint].  
 211 The case was originally filed under the name Grace v. Sessions, but the name was changed by the 
time the judge issued his opinion due to Sessions’s ouster as AG and replacement with Acting AG 
Matthew Whitaker. 
 212 Petitioner’s Complaint, supra note 210, at 5. The plaintiffs were twelve individuals who had fled 
domestic violence and gang violence in Central America and who received negative credible fear 
determinations in the days following A-B-’s release. The complaint posited that prior to A-B-, all the 
plaintiffs would have passed their CFIs. Id. at 4. 
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Guidelines.213 In a strong rebuke of the Trump Administration’s overreach in 
this matter, the judge stated that “it is the will of Congress—not the whims 
of the Executive—that determines the standard for expedited removal.”214 
4. Statistics 
Fiscal year 2018 saw the overall asylum denial rate hit a record high of 
65%.215 One analysis indicated that the grant rate in 2018 was the lowest it 
has been in two decades.216 Data shows that the denial rates spiked beginning 
in June 2018, which is when A-B- was released.217 While it is impossible to 
prove that A-B- was the cause because the government does not publicize 
data about the protected grounds various applicants assert or reasons for 
denial,218 the timing suggests that A-B- likely contributed to this increase in 
denials. Data through September 2019 shows that the denial rate never 
returned to a pre-A-B- level.219 
 
 213 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 146 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018). While traditional 
immigration claims are not reviewable in the federal district courts, systemic challenges to the legality of 
written policies issued by the AG may be brought in the D.C. District. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(ii) 
(2012). 
 214 Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 105. The court held that A-B- and the USCIS Guidelines created a 
“general rule” against applicants with domestic violence and gang-violence based claims succeeding at 
the CFI stage, concluding that this change violated the INA and the Administrative Procedures Act 
because raising the threshold at the CFI stage was “inconsistent with Congress’ intent” that CFIs be a low 
bar and because heightening the standard in this way was “arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 126, 127. 
Further, the court struck down the changes regarding which circuit precedent asylum officers must follow, 
reaffirming the previously established rule that an asylum applicant can pass the CFI stage if precedent 
in any circuit is favorable. Id. at 135–41.The government appealed the District Court’s decision in January 
2019; as of this writing, that appeal is pending. Grace v. Whitaker, 2019 WL 329572, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 
25, 2019), request for stay denied. The government moved for a stay pending the appeal of the case that 
would allow them to continue to enforce the heightened CFI standards, which was denied. Id. As of 
September 2019, oral arguments are scheduled for early December. 
 215 TRACIMMIGRATION, SYRACUSE UNIV., ASYLUM DECISIONS AND DENIALS JUMP IN 2018 tbl.1 
(2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/539 [https://perma.cc/6LZ4-NNWZ] [hereinafter TRAC 
IMMIGRATION 2018 REPORT]. 
 216 Hamed Aleaziz, The US Is Granting Asylum Requests at the Lowest Rate in Two Decades, New 
Statistics Show, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 29, 2018, 5:42 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ 
hamedaleaziz/asylum-grants-lowest-rate-in-two-decades [https://perma.cc/D34B-55VR] (citing an 
analysis done by Sarah Pierce of the Migration Policy Institute of data released by the Department of 
Justice). 
 217 Infra Figure 2. 
 218 TRAC IMMIGRATION 2018 REPORT, supra note 215, at 1. 
 219 TRAC Immigration Graph Tool, supra note 42. 
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FIGURE 2: ASYLUM DENIAL RATES FY 2018220 
 
5. Anecdotal Evidence 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that A-B- had a dramatic effect at the CFI 
stage prior to the Grace injunction.221 Attorneys working at the border 
reported that they saw women be rejected who would have previously 
qualified for asylum, and that they saw the CFI grant rate overall 
“plummet.”222 The executive director of a New Mexico-based immigration 
legal aid organization told reporters that before A-B-, approximately 80% of 
her organization’s male clients at a detention center who had fled gang 
 
 220 Data compiled from TRAC Immigration Graph Tool, supra note 42. TRAC Immigration analyzes 
millions of immigration court records obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests to the 
Executive Office of Immigration Review. The interactive Graph Tool allows users to filter data by various 
factors, including case outcome. About the Data, TRACIMMIGRATION, SYRACUSE UNIV., 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/asylum/about_data.html [https://perma.cc/E592-SZNY].   
 221 See supra notes 211–214 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Grace injunction. 
 222 Laura Gottesdiener & John Washington, They’re Refugees, Fleeing Gang Violence and Domestic 
Abuse. Why Won’t the Trump Administration Let Them In?, NATION (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/trump-asylum-gangs-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/LH7S-
Q99D]; Noah Lanard, Jeff Sessions Has Been Targeting Asylum-Seekers Fleeing Domestic Violence. It’s 
Been “Devastating,” MOTHER JONES (July 26, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2018/07/jeff-sessions-has-been-targeting-asylum-seekers-fleeing-domestic-violence-its-been-
devastating [https://perma.cc/G9JZ-PZJS] (emphasis added); Dara Lind, Jeff Sessions Is Pushing Asylum 
Officers to Reject More Migrants. Will They Go Along?, VOX (July 20, 2018, 10:50 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/7/20/17568480/border-asylum-sessions-credible-fear 
[https://perma.cc/T62C-WCQB] (quoting one immigration attorney who said “everyone is getting 
denied”); Will Weissert & Emily Schmall, ‘Credible Fear’ For U.S. Asylum Harder to Prove Under 
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violence passed their CFIs.223 She estimated that after A-B-, that rate dropped 
to around five or ten percent.224 Another immigration attorney who works at 
a detention center in Texas reported that she has seen credible fear denials 
amongst her clients increase two to four times the previous rate.225 
There is also anecdotal evidence that IJs are interpreting Matter of 
A-B- broadly, contrary to the actual text of the decision. Denise Gilman, the 
director of the immigration law clinic at the University of Texas, reported 
that some judges are reading A-B- as categorically denying gender- or gang-
violence-based asylum claims, adding, “‘[y]ou’re definitely seeing a lot of 
pressure from immigration judges and government attorneys to essentially 
terminate these cases before they are even heard, to refuse to give asylum 
applicants a full day in court if they are at all impacted by Sessions[’s] 
decision.”226 Women in Hutto Detention Center in Texas have told their 
lawyers that they have heard IJs say, “‘[y]our case doesn’t count anymore . . . 
domestic violence doesn’t qualify anymore.’”227 Attorneys reported that in a 
case that was denied, the judge specifically indicated that he believed 
Sessions’s dicta created a higher standard for “unable or unwilling” to 
protect, and that was a reason for rejecting the claim.228 An attorney at the 
Dilley Pro Bono Project reported that IJs have openly stated in court that 
“after Matter of A-B-, no asylum case can be granted using the protected 
ground of particular social group at all.”229 In summary, notwithstanding the 
seemingly modest impact observable in published decisions, many 
immigration lawyers and advocates perceive Matter of A-B- to have 
substantially reshaped the landscape of U.S. asylum law.230 
B. Matter of A-B-’s Potential Effects on LGBTQ Asylum Claims 
Matter of A-B- concerned domestic violence- and gang-violence-based 
asylum claims, but it has potential ramifications for non-state actor and PSG-
based asylum claims in general. Due to the parallels between victims of 
domestic violence and those persecuted for being LGBTQ, this Note now 
examines A-B-’s potential impact on LGBTQ asylum claims. 
 
 223 Gottesdiener & Washington, supra note 222. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Lanard, supra note 222. 
 230 Gottesdiener & Washington, supra note 222. 
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1. Particular Social Group 
Although the biggest legal impact of Matter of A-B- for domestic 
violence-related claims was related to the PSG prong, this shift should not 
have a major effect on LGBTQ claims. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso solidified 
homosexuality as the basis for a PSG in the early 1990s, which has been 
confirmed by every circuit.231 There is no risk of LGBTQ PSGs being 
considered circular, as LGBTQ people are clearly identifiable as a group in 
society independent of any anti-gay violence they may experience. In 
addition, in Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA explicitly affirmed that the PSG 
articulated in Toboso-Alfonso, gay men in Cuba, was a group that would 
satisfy the particularity and social distinction requirements.232 Moreover, in 
a post-A-B- decision from the Fifth Circuit concerning domestic violence by 
a same-sex abuser, the court took for granted that the applicant’s sexual 
orientation claim was on solid footing in a post-A-B- world.233 While 
transgender and bisexual applicants will have a more difficult time 
establishing that they are a member of a PSG because they do not have 
precedent to rely on, these are challenges that existed previously and should 
not be exacerbated by A-B-.234 
However, if any IJs or asylum officers interpret A-B- as prohibiting 
claims based on PSGs altogether, as has been reported anecdotally, this will 
have serious repercussions for LGBTQ applicants, as most such applicants 
rely on membership in a PSG as the protected ground to establish their 
asylum claim.235 While such an interpretation would be illegal, given that 
PSG is included as a protected ground in the definition of refugee in the 
INA,236 the prospect of an IJ determination being overruled as “clearly 
erroneous” on appeal to the BIA will not help the applications that never 
make it that far.237 In addition, while certain applicants could claim 
 
 231 Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990) (recognizing homosexual “men in Cuba” 
as a PSG); ANKER, supra note 30 at 497. This decision was designated as precedential by Attorney 
General Order No. 1895-94 on June 19, 1994. See supra notes 127–131. 
 232 M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 245 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 233 W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202, 213 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We thus assume, without determining, 
that the agency’s dismissal of the sexual-orientation claim was unreasonable.”). The issue in this case 
was government responsibility for attorney’s fees and not the merits of the claim. Id. at 207. 
 234 See supra Section II.A. Some transgender cases have used the PSG recognized by the Ninth 
Circuit, “gay men with female sexual identities,” to bring their claims, but this PSG is not well-suited to 
many transgender people’s claims, as it does not accurately reflect their identities. See Jenkins, supra note 
130, 75–80 (quoting Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 226 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 235 See Gottesdiener & Washington, supra note 222. 
 236 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
 237 See Legomsky, supra note 90, at 402 (discussing the reasons why meritorious claims might not 
be appealed, including “lack of awareness, lack of resources, or a variety of other reasons that might have 
nothing to do with the merits”); supra Section I.B.3. 
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alternative protected grounds, like “political opinion,” this will only help 
certain types of applicants.238 
2. Unwilling or Unable to Protect 
The “unwilling or unable” to protect prong is a bigger area of concern 
for LGBTQ asylum advocates because proving this element was already a 
challenge for LGBTQ applicants.239 Although A-B- does not create a 
heightened standard for “unable or unwilling,” this element will likely be 
subject to greater scrutiny in light of the AG’s copious dicta on the subject.240 
This issue is of particular concern in the LGBTQ context, as it was already 
becoming more difficult to prove this element in countries that enact LGBTQ 
anti-discrimination statutes or legalize same-sex marriage.241 Such measures 
make it harder to convince asylum adjudicators that governments are 
“unwilling or unable” to protect LGBTQ people, despite the fact that in 
reality, passing such statutes often leads to societal backlash that 
paradoxically results in increased persecution.242 Furthermore, just because 
the laws are on the books does not mean that the government actually takes 
steps to protect LGBTQ people.243 In addition, any positive effects of these 
statutes largely benefit lesbian and gay people, while transgender people 
remain disproportionately victimized.244 
While these problems already existed prior to A-B-, the decision is 
nevertheless likely to cause adjudicators to be more critical of the “unwilling 
or unable” to protect element. Tania Garcia, an attorney at the National 
Immigrant Justice Center’s (NIJC) LGBT Immigrant Rights Initiative, 
reported within a few months after A-B-’s release that she had heard of 
several LGBTQ asylum claim denials that NIJC suspects were due to A-B-.245 
Although it is impossible to know the IJ’s grounds for denial until the cases 
are appealed, Garcia believes the cases were rejected because the IJ 
incorrectly interpreted A-B- as creating a heightened standard for “unable or 
unwilling” to protect.246 
 
 238 See supra Section II.B. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Interview with Tania Garcia, Senior Litigation Attorney at NIJC LGBT Rights Initiative and 
Federal Litigation Project, conducted by author (Oct. 13, 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Tania 
Garcia Interview]. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id.; see also ANKER, supra note 30, at 503 (“[O]ften times important, but limited, advancements 
for LGBT individuals result in intense societal backlash.”). 
 243 Tania Garcia Interview, supra note 240. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
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3. Nexus 
The LGBTQ asylum claims that are likely most threatened by A-B- are 
those that most closely resemble the claims discussed in A-B-, namely 
LGBTQ victims of intimate partner violence and gang violence. Such 
applicants will likely have trouble proving “nexus”— that their persecution 
was “on account of” their sexual orientation-based PSG.247 LGBTQ victims 
of gang violence have previously encountered such difficulties.248 In theory, 
such applicants could still have a valid asylum claim. Asylum applicants 
need not prove that their protected status is the only reason for their 
persecution, only that it is “one central reason.”249 However, post-
A-B- LGBTQ applicants may struggle to prove that their sexual orientation 
was “one central reason” motivating their persecution alongside a personal 
relationship or financial interest; IJs who misinterpret the holding of A-B- as 
creating a categorical bar to domestic violence claims may reject same-sex 
intimate partner violence claims outright, failing to consider the ways that 
the persecution was motivated in part by the applicant’s sexual orientation.250 
In addition, because of the Attorney General’s control over immigration 
judges and their lack of professional safeguards, even adjudicators who 
understand that A-B- does not create a categorical bar on domestic violence 
and gang violence claims might feel pressured to summarily reject those 
types of cases due to the AG’s language in A-B-.251 If the anecdotal evidence 
 
 247 Infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 248 See, e.g., Martinez-Almendares v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 724 F. App’x 168, 171–72 (3d Cir. 
2018) (referencing IJ’s holding that sexual orientation was not “one central reason” for an attack by a 
gang on a gay man in Honduras and that it was instead motivated by greed, and finding insufficient 
evidence that gay men were systematically persecuted, despite media reports showing gay men were 
victims of frequently unsolved acts of gang violence, because such reports on gang violence were 
generalized); Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 781 F.3d 677, 686–87 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming 
denial of asylum where applicant failed to show being gay was “one central reason” motivating his 
persecution by gangs and where IJ found that his persecution was instead motivated by their financial 
interest in stealing from him). 
 249 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012); See generally S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 1996); NIJC 
Asylum Basics Manual, supra note 68, at 12. 
 250 For an example of this type of reasoning, see W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 
2019). There, the court discussed the IJ’s initial denial of a female applicant’s asylum claim where she 
was forced into a romantic relationship and repeatedly abused by a female former police officer. The IJ 
“recogniz[ed] that homosexual individuals may constitute a cognizable particular social group,” but 
concluded that the abuse was “not motivated by any alleged perception that [W.M.V.C.] was 
homosexual,” but rather by the personal relationship between the two women and the abuser’s alcohol 
consumption. Id. 
 251 See supra Section I.B.2. IJs are currently under tremendous pressure to close cases quickly given 
an increased backlog of cases and procedural changes made by the Trump Administration, including 
imposing a strict quota system and eliminating tools that were previously used to manage docket sizes, 
such as administrative closure. See Chase, supra note 93 (discussing IJ quotas). This pressure is especially 
palpable for new hires, who work on a probationary period for several years. Id. Department of Justice 
officials have emphasized to newly hired IJs the importance of their role as Executive Branch employees 
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is correct and many asylum officers and IJs are categorically rejecting 
domestic violence and gang-related claims, many LGBTQ people with those 
types of claims will likely be rejected before they have an opportunity to 
properly argue their claim.252 
4. Credible Fear Interviews 
If the D.C. District Court’s injunction in Grace v. Whitaker is upheld, 
it will prevent the greatest threat from A-B- to LGBTQ asylum seekers from 
being realized. The changes to the credible fear standards were particularly 
concerning to asylum advocates because CFIs are conducted by asylum 
officers, who are neither attorneys nor judges, and who may be likely to come 
to erroneous conclusions about what A-B- means based on the misleading 
USCIS Guidelines.253 CFI decisions are subject to little oversight or 
review.254 Therefore, the agency guidelines likely would have resulted in 
LGBTQ victims of intimate partner violence and gang violence being 
summarily rejected at the border. Whitney Drake, an immigration attorney, 
stated that her organization witnessed individuals with PSG claims not 
related to domestic violence or gang violence be rejected at the CFI stage, 
which she suspected was due to A-B-.255 This included a lesbian who fled 
persecution on account of her sexual orientation in Honduras.256 If the district 
court’s decision in Grace v. Whitaker is overturned on appeal, the changes 
to the CFI standards will likely result in an increase in such incidents.257 
 
and following directives from the AG. Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Opening 
Remarks at Investiture of 31 Newly Appointed Immigration Judges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 15, 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-opening-
remarks-investiture-31-newly [https://perma.cc/MZ7P-FHBV]. A former immigration judge has 
described the effect of cases like A-B- as “indoctrinating” new IJs into believing that “these are not real 
claims.” Chase, supra note 93. 
 252 See supra Section III.A.5. 
 253 See supra Section III.A.3. 
 254 Supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 255 Gottesdiener & Washington, supra note 222. 
 256 Id. 
 257 After the injunction, the USCIS sent an email to its asylum offices affirming that there is no 
general rule barring domestic violence and gang-violence based claims at the CFI stage, and that each 
case must be assessed on its own merits. Email from John L. Lafferty to Refugee, Asylum and 
International Operations (RAIO) (Dec. 19, 2018, 11:12 PM) (on file with University of California 
Hastings College of the Law), available at  https://uchastings.app.box.com/s/k99txxw746bg7 
wghirak8w7d86tq1njt/file/381907557596 [https://perma.cc/A8MT-RSJV]. The agency also issued an 
updated version of its guidelines with the misleading language redacted. USCIS Guidelines, supra note 
209. Thus, if the injunction is upheld, any erroneous rejections of LGBTQ asylum claims at the CFI stage 
will no longer be attributable to the A-B- agency guidelines, but rather to larger problems in the asylum 
system related to discretion and lack of meaningful review. 
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5. Discretion 
A-B-’s likely other major impact on LGBTQ asylum claims relates to 
the role of discretion in the asylum system. Discretion has resulted in major 
discrepancies in asylum decisions of all types, and Sessions’s decision in 
A-B- encourages adjudicators to use this tool even when an applicant is 
technically eligible for asylum.258 There are already anecdotal examples of 
IJs applying inaccurate interpretations of A-B-;259 in a system with less 
discretion and more meaningful review of IJ decisions, such mistakes could 
be corrected on review, and adjudicators would be incentivized to apply the 
correct interpretation of the law due to a threat of reversal.260 However, 
because of the lack of meaningful review in the asylum system, many of 
these decisions will likely never be corrected, which can have potentially 
deadly consequences for many asylum seekers.261 
This is of particular concern in the LGBTQ context because IJs might 
have “strong personal opinions” about issues involving sexual orientation 
and gender identity.262 This could cause them to use their discretion to reject 
LGBTQ claims, not because of lack of merit, but because of reliance on 
 
 258 A-B-, 27 I&N 316, 345 n.12 (A.G. 2018). 
 259 See supra Section III.A.5. 
 260 See supra Section I.B.3. 
 261 See id. 
 262 Paul O’Dwyer, A Well-Founded Fear of Having My Sexual Orientation Asylum Claim Heard in 
the Wrong Court, 52 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 186 (2008). (“[T]he outcome of these claims depends, to 
an unacceptable extent, on the adjudicator’s subjective opinions about sexual identity.”). Despite great 
strides in legal protections for LGBTQ Americans in recent decades, homophobia remains an issue in the 
U.S. In 2018, GLAAD’s annual survey of Americans’ social attitudes towards the LGBTQ community 
showed for the first time in several years an increase in Americans who reported feeling very or somewhat 
uncomfortable around queer people at least some of the time. GLAAD Acceptance Report, supra note 
15. Their report also showed a significant increase in LGBTQ people who reported experiencing 
discrimination on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Id. Data for 2017 showed an 
increase in reports of hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation bias. New FBI Statistics Show  
Alarming Increase in Number of Reported Hate Crimes, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://www.hrc.org/blog/new-fbi-statistics-show-alarming-increase-in-number-of-reported-hate-crimes 
[https://perma.cc/HZB8-6TBF]. Immigration judges are not immune from these sentiments, especially 
those appointed by an administration that shares them. A Department of Justice investigation into 
politicized hiring by the George W. Bush DOJ found that interviews for new IJs sometimes sought to 
determine whether candidates had the proper, conservative views on “god, guns + gays”; a candidate 
whose views on these issues were not aligned with the administration’s was not hired. U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AN INVESTIGATION  
OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE  
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 104 (2008), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H2EM-SSMH]. The Trump Administration removed procedural safeguards that had 
helped reduce politicized hiring of IJs for many years, leading to a resurgence of alleged politicized hiring. 
1 AM. BAR ASS’N, 2019 UPDATE REPORT: REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 14, 17 (2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/2019_reformi
ng_the_immigration_system_volume_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN4Z-GCFY]. 
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stereotypes or personal prejudice.263 Decisions on LGBTQ claims based on 
improper motives have been overturned in the past, often involving 
egregious and blatant examples of reliance on stereotypes.264 Therefore, it is 
not unreasonable to assume there have been and will be additional, less 
obviously biased rejections of LGBTQ asylum claims based on the IJ’s own 
prejudices. This is cause for concern because other cases in which the IJ 
appeared to rely on equally suspect reasoning have been upheld because of 
the deferential standard of review.265 Of the few cases that make it to the level 
of court of appeals review, only the most extreme will get past the deferential 
standard of review. Meanwhile, the majority of IJ decisions made for 
improper reasons are likely less blatant.266 In short, regardless of whether 
Matter of A-B- should have any impact on LGBTQ asylum claims based on 
its actual contents, the opinion will likely embolden asylum adjudicators who 
are already biased against LGBTQ asylum seekers to reject more of their 
claims.267 
IV. RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW 
The discrepancy between what Matter of A-B- says and what it does in 
terms of LGBTQ asylum claims highlights serious problems with the rule of 
law in the asylum context: “The very essence of the rule of law . . . is that 
individual cases should be disposed of by reference to standardized norms 
rather than by arbitrary factors, particularly the personal biases, attitudes, 
policies, or ideologies of government adjudicators.”268 In a “government of 
 
 263 O’Dwyer, supra note 262, at 186. 
 264 See, e.g., Todorovic v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 1318, 1321, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2010) 
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identified as gay); Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 479 (2d Cir. 2008) (remanding because IJ relied on gay 
stereotypes); Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 2008) (remanding in part because IJ was 
flippant about the danger an HIV positive applicant faced); Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027, 1029 
(8th Cir. 2007) (remanding because IJ’s finding that applicant’s mannerisms did not show that he was 
gay tainted the decision). 
 265 See, e.g., Mockeviciene v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 237 Fed. App’x 569, 572, 574 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(expressing “skeptic[ism]” about the IJ’s conclusion that because a Lithuanian lesbian did not participate 
in groups involving “lesbian activities” or have a girlfriend in the U.S., she was “[a]t best . . . a non-
practicing lesbian,” but ultimately upholding the IJ’s decision). 
 266 Cf. Derald Wing Sue, et. al., Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical 
Practice, 62 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 271, 272, 284 (2007) (discussing the ways in which American racism 
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 267 This is additionally concerning because many LGBTQ asylum seekers are also people of color 
who are vulnerable to multiple forms of prejudice. Bowmani, supra note 81, at 11. 
 268 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note †, at 299–300. 
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laws, and not of men,”269 adjudicators should make decisions based on a fair 
application of the law to the facts, not irrelevant factors such as their personal 
feelings towards the parties, or which outcome is most favored by the 
Attorney General.270 In such a nation, Matter of A-B- would have had only a 
modest impact on the outcomes of asylum claims of all types, and 
particularly LGBTQ-based claims. Instead the release of Matter of 
A-B- coincided with an increase in denial rates that has persisted for over a 
year, and there are reports of LGBTQ asylum seekers whose claims have 
been rejected as a result. This case study shows that the discretion afforded 
to ground-level decision-makers and the power concentrated in the person of 
the AG in the immigration context are contrary to the norms of checks and 
balances fundamental to the U.S. democratic system and reveals the need for 
major reforms to the asylum process. While the prospects of the following 
changes being enacted under the current administration are slim, these are 
nevertheless ideas that Congress could pursue to reduce the odds of 
situations like A-B- recurring in the future. 
A. Attorney General’s Certification Power 
It is difficult to imagine a clearer illustration of why the Attorney 
General’s certification power is dangerous than Matter of A-B-, and 
Congress should amend the INA to remove this power. It is reckless to 
concentrate this much power over the lives of many into the hands of a single 
person. Agency-head review “entails the substitution of one person’s 
judgment for the collective judgment of several adjudicators. And the 
probability that a strong ideological bias will influence the result is greater 
when one person is deciding.”271 While the certification power’s benefits in 
terms of efficiency may have seemed worth the risks under previous 
administrations when the power often went unused for years at a time,272 the 
Trump Administration’s aggressive use of this tool273 to enact wide-reaching 
 
 269 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 270 See Legomsky, supra note 90, at 401 (discussing the ways in which the lack of decisional 
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Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 461 (2007). 
 272 Supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
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policy changes without restriction reveals that the risks of this power 
outweigh any rewards, especially in light of the life and death stakes. 
B. Discretion 
Finding ways to rein in discretion at all levels of the asylum process 
should be a priority of any reform effort. One simple step that could help 
accomplish this is finding ways to increase transparency and documentation 
in the asylum process, such as requiring publication of all asylum officer, 
immigration judge, and BIA decisions, which would allow for better 
oversight. In addition, agencies at every step of the process should begin 
tracking data including applicants’ stated protected ground for relief and 
demographic information such as sexual orientation and race.274 With such 
information available, agencies could begin identifying adjudicators with 
grant rates that indicate they might be biased against certain types of 
applicants, such as LGBTQ claims. Once adjudicators are identified as 
biased against entire groups of claimants, they should no longer be allowed 
to decide cases involving such claimants on an individual basis. If, for 
instance, an IJ’s grant rate on LGBTQ cases is significantly lower than 
average or differs significantly from their own grant rates for different types 
of claims, they could be assigned a partner with whom to review those types 
of claims. If the two IJs cannot agree, a third judge could be brought in to 
break the tie. If patterns of discriminatory decision-making persist, 
disciplinary measures should be required.275 
A more far-reaching solution that could help solve many of the 
problems illuminated by Matter of A-B- would be to remove immigration 
courts from the control of the Department of Justice altogether and convert 
immigration courts into independent, Article I courts subject to direct review 
by Article III courts, similar to bankruptcy courts.276 Such a step would both 
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eliminate the Attorney General’s self-certification power and reign in the 
discretion of asylum adjudicators by subjecting them to more rigorous and 
regimented oversight. It would allow for the creation of more binding 
precedent and a return to a less deferential standard of review. Finally, such 
courts would be more neutral and independent than executive agency courts 
by removing them from the control of the Attorney General and protecting 
IJs and BIA members from the threat of being fired for failing to conform to 
the AG’s vision.277 
C. Representation 
Multiple studies have shown that the single most important factor 
affecting the odds of an asylum seeker’s success is whether they are 
represented by counsel.278 In the context of a situation like Matter of A-B-, 
this seems particularly relevant. Although most LGBTQ claims should not 
be prevented from succeeding based on Matter of A-B-, many pro se 
applicants may struggle to make complex legal arguments articulating why 
that is. An attorney can make sure to take steps such as highlighting the fact 
that A-B- is mostly dicta and does not change any standards, properly 
articulating a PSG that is most likely to pass muster, and highlighting any 
other potential protected grounds, such as political opinion. In light of the 
importance of representation and the consequences of having an asylum 
claim denied, an urgent reform should ensure that all asylum seekers are 
provided with representation at the government’s expense, as in the criminal 
context.279 
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CONCLUSION 
In theory, Matter of A-B- should have little to no jurisprudential impact 
on LGBTQ asylum claims. The decision’s only actual holding is to overturn 
Matter of A-R-C-G-, which established a single specific precedential PSG 
for domestic violence claims. Any language in A-B- that appears to create a 
higher standard for showing the government’s unwillingness or inability to 
protect in non-state actor claims is only dicta—an interpretation that has been 
reflected by most circuit court and BIA decisions that have applied the 
decision so far. Although LGBTQ people whose claims involve intimate 
partner violence or gang violence will likely face increased difficulty, 
A-B- does not create a categorical bar to those types of claims, and they 
should still be able to prevail if they can prove all the elements. Many of the 
challenges facing these types of LGBTQ applicants and other LGBTQ 
applicants existed prior to A-B-. 
However, A-B-’s practical impact is more alarming. Because of the role 
of discretion in asylum proceedings and the lack of judicial independence, 
many asylum officers and immigration judges have and will continue to 
misinterpret and misapply A-B-, causing them to reject more claims 
involving non-state actors. This is particularly concerning in the LGBTQ 
context because many people already hold personal biases against LGBTQ 
people. Furthermore, even IJs who are not personally biased may feel 
pressured to reject more non-state actor claims given the Attorney General’s 
influence over their job security. Because of the nature of the asylum system, 
the asylum claims denied at this stage are unlikely to receive meaningful 
review. 
The discrepancy between what Matter of A-B- says and what it does 
raises serious concerns about the rule of law in the U.S. asylum system, 
implicating the Attorney General’s self-certification power, the role of 
discretion, and the lack of judicial independence. The case of Matter of 
A-B- reveals that in the asylum context, one person has the power to release 
a decision that legally does not change very much, but regardless can be 
applied in a sweeping way that can impact thousands of lives. In the asylum 
context, the stakes are life and death. In light of this, systemic changes must 
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be made to the U.S. asylum system in order to create a fair and just system 
that protects LGBTQ people and all other victims of persecution. 
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